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The argument of this thesis is that the early success of building DCMR does not 
mean real consolidation without active non-governmental actors and a dynamic civil 
society. Drawing attention to the non-state side of civil-military relations is crucial to 
improving the quality of DCMR. 
The thesis claims, that the horizontal dimension of the Hungarian CMR has 
undergone a long and complex learning process. Nevertheless, the civil society 
component of the Hungarian CMR received less attention and its development was slow 
and controversial. This process is shown by the case of three types of NGOs (protest, 
research and educator, and cultural organizations) in Hungary between the late 1980s and 
2002.  
Today tendencies are promising because these organizations are more diverse 
than earlier and the emerging economy could provide additional resources for them. 
Nevertheless, the state support for improving this activity remains very important but it 
calls for considering increasingly democratic values. Furthermore, the current status of 
the defense- and military-related civil society calls for promotion from NATO and the 
European Union as well. It would be important increasing the attractiveness this field and 
as a result the civilian participation in it, which could be the basis of the improvement of 
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The argument of this thesis is that the early success of building DCMR does not 
mean real consolidation without active non-governmental actors and a dynamic civil 
society. Drawing attention to the non-state side of civil-military relations is crucial to 
improving the quality of DCMR in Hungary, and probably in general as well. The 
“horizontal actors” of civil-military relations could provide independent experts, or at 
least relatively independent experts other than the political parties’ experts, for 
monitoring certain areas of civil-military relations. These organizations could be potential 
sources for civilian experts and could help decrease the level of corruption and the 
nonfunctional effects of political/bureaucratic coalition building between civilians and 
military leaders. In other words, it would improve the effective control of civilians over 
the military. Additionally, its role is to prevent the further alienation of citizens on 
military-related issues. Thus, a stronger horizontal dimension to CMR would also 
improve military integration into society.  
The thesis claims, that the horizontal dimension of the Hungarian CMR has 
undergone a long and complex learning process. Nevertheless, the civil society 
component of the Hungarian CMR received less attention from experts and its 
development was slow and controversial. This process is shown by the case of three types 
of NGOs (protest, research and educator, and cultural organizations) in Hungary between 
the late 1980s and 2002.  
Today tendencies are promising because these organizations are more diverse 
than earlier and the emerging economy could provide additional resources for them. 
Nevertheless, the state support for improving this activity remained very important but it 
calls for considering increasingly democratic values instead of short-term political party 
benefits. Furthermore, the status today of the defense- and military-related civil society 
calls for promotion from NATO and the European Union as well. It would be important 
increasing the attractiveness this field and as a result the (non-political) civilian 
participation in it, which could be the basis of the improvement of the quality of 




























The role of civil society in the transition from a non-democratic to a democratic 
system has been crucial in many countries. In fact, civil society played an important role 
in Hungary during its transition just as in other Central European countries.1 However, 
after the transition period some experts complained about the weakness of civil society 
and its organizations because of their lack of control over the state bureaucracy. Other 
experts do not share this opinion and point to the numerous civil organizations created 
after communism. However, very few of the NGOs are able to mobilize the masses for 
political purposes.2 Beyond these debates, it is generally accepted that a dynamic civil 
society is an important “arena” in a democracy.  Therefore, it is important to examine it. 
There is also a widely shared opinion that the part of civil society dealing with defense-
related issues is very weak in Hungary. 
This weakness matters because, another significant issue is the building of 
democratic civil-military relations (DCMR) after communism. This was vital in the post-
communist countries where during communism the military was definitely subordinate to 
politics, or more exactly to the Communist Party. Obviously, controlling the military and 
the other armed organizations has been crucial during the transition to democracy 
because the authoritarian system used these forces to ensure not only external stability 
but internal stability as well. 
The institutional and legal foundations concerning democratic control of the 
military were mainly created during the early phase of the transitions, but effective 
democratic control over the national armed forces has been lacking. The deficiencies 
have led to so-called “second generation” reforms3 for consolidating the structure and the 
                                                 
1 Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 
1992) 2-3; Anrew Arato, From Neo-Marxism to Democratic Theory: Essays on the Critical Theory of 
Soviet-Type Societies (New York: M.E. Sharpe 1993) 296-309; Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems 
of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996) 7. 
2 András Körösényi: A magyar politikai rendszer (The Hungarian Political System) (Budapest: Osiris, 
1998) 163. 
3 Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmunds and Andrew Cottey, “The Second Generation Problematic: 
Rethinking Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Central and Eastern Europe” (Civil-Military Relations 
in Central and eastern Europe, TCMR 1.7, Internet Resource Centre, 2000) 11-12 http://civil-
military.dsd.kcl.ac.uk/. 
2 
working mechanisms. During these “second generation” reforms, Hungary and its 
Western supporters should be concerned with encouraging a defense-related civil society 
to be a core component of DCMR.  
DCMR is more than state legislative and executive control over the military. 
Democratic control contains elements from non-governmental organizations and from 
civil society as well as from military organizations. The relations between the branches of 
state power and the military structure embody the most significant part of civil-military 
relations. At the same time, the state alone is not able to accomplish the democratization 
of civil-military relations, and also is not able to satisfy all the requirements of DCMR.  
The argument of this thesis is that the early success of building DCMR does not 
mean real consolidation without active non-governmental actors and a dynamic civil 
society. Drawing attention to the non-state side of civil-military relations is crucial to 
improving the quality of DCMR in Hungary, and probably in general as well. The 
“horizontal actors”4 of civil-military relations could provide independent experts, or at 
least relatively independent experts other than the political parties’ experts, for 
monitoring certain areas of civil-military relations. These organizations could be potential 
sources for civilian experts and could help decrease the level of corruption and the 
nonfunctional effects of political/bureaucratic coalition building between civilians and 
military leaders. In other words, it would improve the effective control of civilians over 
the military. Additionally, its role is to prevent the further alienation of citizens on 
military-related issues. Thus, a stronger horizontal dimension to CMR would also 
improve military integration into society. The horizontal aspect of DCMR has not been as 
effectively influenced by NATO and EU enlargement as has other aspects.  
Examining the quality of civil-military relations calls for research on the civil 
society component. It is important in Hungary for the following reasons: 
• Most of the illegal and semi-legal groups in civil society in the communist 
era converted to become actors in the political system during the 
democratic transition.5 Furthermore, the defense-oriented civil society did 
                                                 
4 Hans Born, Multiple Control and the Armed Forces in Democracies: The Case of the Netherlands 
(Manuscript, 2000). 
5 A part of the illegal civil movements became political parties and so leaders of the civil society 
politicians during the democratic transition. 
3 
not exist during communism. There was thus little military expertise 
within the non-state actors in Hungary after the transition. 
• The lack of transparency of the Hungarian military also emphasizes the 
need for non-governmental actors. Although clear regulations about the 
decision-making process are able to guarantee political oversight of the 
military, the lack of civilian experts and the coalition building between 
civilian and military bureaucrats draws attention to the importance of the 
non-governmental actors. The lack of civilian experts has caused problems 
such as military dominance in the Ministry of Defense and politicization 
of the military elite. Some non-governmental organizations can be a 
source of civilian experts, while some can contribute to keeping the state 
bureaucracy accountable.   
• Hungarian civil-military relations also suffer from the existing gap 
between society and the military. Communism decimated society and 
therefore severed the conventional forms of civil-military relations. The 
democratic transition eliminated communist-type organizations. The 
relationship between society and the military is changing in the post-cold 
war era. Reconciling this relationship calls for new solutions. Certain non-
state actors could play a significant role. 
• The conditions of the horizontal aspect of DCMR depend on domestic 
circumstances, but external players, such as NATO, the EU, and the 
international NGOs have also influenced its development. These 
organizations have directly and indirectly influenced the non-state side of 
civil-military relations but the effect of these activities is not obvious and 
has not previously been examined. 
The thesis contains six chapters including the introduction (Chapter I) and the 
conclusion (Chapter VI). Chapter II defines democratic civil-military relations and 
emphasizes the significance of the “horizontal” actors. It also describes the potential 
forms or types of organizations as well as their roles in DCMR. The next three chapters 
trace the development of Hungarian CMR chronologically. Each historical chapter covers 
a different governing cycle (1990-94, 1994-98, and 1998-2002). This organization was 
chosen because the significant effects of governments in the Hungarian parliamentary 
system led to important changes when the ruling parties changed in 1994 and 1998. 
Governments’ policies have been obviously important concerning CMR, but also 
concerning the civil society because they could introduce laws (using their majority in the 
parliament). These decisions related to forming, regulating, and cooperating with the civil 
society. Each chapter starts with an overview describing the main features of the 
Hungarian civil-military relations during the years in question. It continues in discussing 
4 
the development of civil society and describes the influences that guide three types of 
organizations: protest, national defense-culture-related, and “think-tank-like” 
organizations.  
The conclusion highlights that the Hungarian CMR-related structures and 
procedures underwent a remarkable learning process during three governing cycles. 
Nevertheless, the development of the horizontal dimension of CMR was relatively slow 
and controversial. The polemic nature of the development of the horizontal actors is 
linked to the strong dependence on state financial resources. The result is that most of the 
military-related NGOs serve the military and the state and hardly control it. The 
conclusion also underlines that military-related civil society calls for promotion from 
NATO and the European Union for increasing the attractiveness this field and as a result 
the civilian participation in it, which could be the basis of the improvement of the quality 
of democratic civil-military relations. 
The methodology used for this thesis contains theoretical and descriptive 
elements. The next chapter is normative and is based on academic literature analysis. The 
following descriptive chapters are based on literature, journal and primary source analysis 
including documents, NGOs’ Internet homepages, and interviews. 
5 
II. DCMR AND NON-STATE ACTORS  
Understanding civil-military relations, or its narrower meaning of civilian control, 
was not a smooth process in the former communist countries. On the one hand, the 
western terminology was brand new, and on the other hand, the messages were not 
always clearly stated at the beginning of the democratic transition. During the 1990s, 
there were debates in Central and Eastern Europe about the meaning of civil-military 
relations or civilian control. Extreme interpretations occurred from time to time, and it 
has taken time to reach the proper interpretation. 
One of the extreme interpretations did not consider civilian control to be 
democratic, and narrowed its meaning to the duty of top civilian leaders concerning the 
military. Furthermore, many times this duty was considered to be just a checking 
function. Naturally, these misperceptions of democratic control led to a misperception on 
the military side as well. The military feared a new type of commissar system resulting 
again in political instead of professional requirements for their careers. These earlier 
weak interpretations have since been eliminated in the long learning process since 1989. 
However, a strictly state-centric approach, which rarely considers other democratic actors 
besides elected state officials and their institutions, has remained popular. 
However, some in the West initiated the other extreme, or the idea of a politically 
sterile military. The oversimplification of the separation of the political and the military 
subsystem, using Huntington’s definitive work The Soldier and the State, resulted in a 
concept where the military merely obeyed politicians. This interpretation did not consider 
that the military has its own values and interests and is not just simply a recipient of 
political decisions, but was also an influential actor in the decision making process. 
Although democratically elected civilian authorities have used military experts since the 
first day after the free elections, the realization that the military would pursue its own 
interests took time.6  
                                                 
6 Stefan Sarvas, “Professional Soldiers and Politics: A Case of Central and Eastern Europe”, Armed 
Forces and Society, Fall 1999. 
6 
At the same time, the usefulness of the “praetorian” lesson was very limited 
because, at least in Hungary, the military was not heavily involved in the different 
subsystems of society, as in Portugal or Latin America. Rather, the military was 
politicized and controlled by the communist party down to the very last soldier. 
Moreover, in Hungary, and in Czechoslovakia, the military was rather alienated from 
society and the military itself was demoralized to a certain degree by the end of the 
1980s. It was alienated because it embodied communist and Soviet rather than national 
traditions and represented the authoritarian system. It was demoralized because the 
officers were not motivated properly. The military assets were amortized, working 
conditions declined, and professional soldiers were forced to stay in the military by unfair 
contracts while the civilian sector offered better ways of living for them.7  
These post-communist experiences show that civil-military relations in 
democratic countries differ according to their democratic systems, their political and 
military traditions, their societal conditions, and last, but not least, the current mindsets in 
a given country. Scholars have made efforts to create theories and methodologies capable 
of describing the most effective forms of democratic civil-military relations and of 
ascertaining the current reality and trends of civil-military relations. These efforts were 
motivated by “malfunctions” such as coups, by the Cold War, and by the third wave of 
democratization. As part of the latter, post-communist democratization definitely 
encouraged these efforts. 
Western scientists, schools and institutions launched new projects about civil-
military relations during the post-communist transition. As it has turned out, none of the 
Western democracies has been able to offer a clear path for post-communist countries 
because of the different social, historical, political and economical circumstances in the 
former Soviet bloc. Furthermore, neither the existing theories, nor the lesson of 
democratization of “praetorian” states, could provide satisfactory tools for ex-communist 
countries which are so different in so many ways. 
                                                 
7 In 1985, many cadets left the military right after the graduation at military colleges and refused to 
serve as officers due to the worsening working and living conditions. The scandal failed to achieve any real 
solutions. Instead, it became almost impossible for career soldiers to leave the military in the future until 
the change of regime. That was one of the reasons why thousands of these career soldiers left the military 
during the transition when restrictions were withdrawn and downsizing was a declared aim. 
7 
All of this has created a rather confusing situation concerning civil-military 
relations and many research projects have been initiated in this field. Numerous projects 
and institutions created since 1989 have as a goal the successful democratization of post-
communist civil-military relations or even just moving forward with western concepts 
and theories.  
Although there is no one magic way to develop “good” civil-military relations, 
since it is not a puzzle with just one correct solution, defining the most important 
democratic requirement was vital for the emerging democracies and to the mature 
democracies as well. It was important for the new democracies because it was a 
fundamental step in understanding and building a democratic system. It was also an 
essential problem for donor democracies because they wanted to influence and control 
this process while they rediscovered their own traditional differences and their own 
dilemmas in this field.8 
A. DEFINING DEMOCRATIC CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
Dealing with the particular questions of Hungarian civil-military relations, it is 
worthwhile to summarize the overall meaning and the requirements of democratic civil-
military relations. According to Peter Feaver, civil-military relations encompass the entire 
range of relationships between the military and society at every level.9 At the same time, 
the most significant parts of the literature deal with civilian control of the military and 
with the relationship between society and the armed forces. The vast majority of the 
civilian control studies focus on the democratic way of directing and checking the armed 
forces. 
The fundamental question has been what kind of “solutions” democracies have 
used to control the military. The question has been “ever-relevant” since Plato, because 
the military, as the very institution created to protect the state, is given sufficient power to 
                                                 
8 Peter D. Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of 
Civilian Control” Armed Forces and Society, Winter 1996, 149-178; Douglas L. Bland, “A Unified Theory 
Of Civil-Military Relations” Armed Forces and Society, Fall 1999, 7-26. 
9 Peter D. Feaver, “Civil-Military Relations” Annual Reviews Political Science, 1999. 2. 211. 
8 
become a threat to the state.10 The standard democratic answer to this question requires 
the following institutional and societal conditions11: 
• A democratically elected body (parliament, congress) has to appropriately 
decide essential questions such as the roles and missions of the military, 
the defense budget, the proper size of the armed forces, the type of 
organization (compulsory military service vs. an all voluntary force) of the 
military, and the arms acquisitions. 
• The rule of law has to define the roles of the branches of state power and 
the military concerning defense matters. It has to guarantee that neither the 
executive power nor the military can use the armed forces for its own, 
particular purpose.  
• The hierarchical responsibility of the military to the government must be 
established through a civilian organization of public administration 
(Ministry or Department of Defense) charged with control over the 
military. 
• A democratically educated and socialized military, which knows the 
democratic rules and accept the primacy of civilian authorities, must be 
created and maintained. 
• A part of the civil society (self-organized, independent groups) and a wide 
range of other non-governmental organizations (think-tanks, media, etc.) 
have to focus on defense and/or security matters.  
These democratic conditions mean that there are three specific aspects of 
democratic control over the armed forces. The first is “vertical control,”12 which refers to 
legislative, juridical and executive control. The second is “horizontal control” embodied 
in non-governmental actors. The third is the self-control of the military in accordance 
with the democratic values, norms and attitudes of the military.13 
The efforts in new democracies and also the efforts of their advisers from 
established Western democracies primarily focused on the first aspect of democratic 
control over the military. This was true in both the so-called former “praetorian” states 
and in the former communist countries as well. The vertical aspect was given priority for 
                                                 
10 P. Fever: 213. 
11 Adapted from: Rudolf Joó, The Democratic Control of the Armed Forces: The Experience of 
Hungary (Chaillot Paper 23. Paris: Institute for Security Studies Western European Union, February 1996) 
6-7. 
12 Hans Born, ibid. 7.  
13 It is worth noting that the postmodern feature of the state, especially in the European Union, 
improves the international and transnational organizations’ role in controlling the national armed forces. 
However this control has been indirect so far.     
9 
two reasons. The first is the primary role of the state in controlling the military. Second, 
because democracy is a form of governance, which assumes the existence of a state, 
establishing the Soviet successor states and restructuring state organizations was the most 
important goal.14 The primary role of the state has been decisive in democratic control 
over the military because of the need to create democratic decision making processes, 
requiring firm subordination of the military to the elected civilian authorities, and the de-
politicization of the military in post-communist countries, or the de-militarization of the 
political subsystem in “praetorian” countries.  
The efforts of domestic and foreign expert advisors concerning this state-centric 
approach to democratic control resulted in a relatively low-cost and quick success in 
democratization. It was true in Hungary, just as in many Central and Eastern European 
countries, where politicians have had to justify the democratization to NATO and to the 
European Union. The legal and institutional background of controlling the military was 
created relatively quickly and the real deficiencies have not been obvious. NATO has 
encouraged this approach and was satisfied with the young democracies because almost 
every document stated the requirement of democratic control over the military, even 
though the clear interpretation had not been expressed.15  
However, as far as the post-communist armed forces are concerned, there was 
another, secondary aspect of the efforts, namely democratic education and the 
socialization of the professional militaries. There were many decisions concerning this, 
but it essentially remained a question of time. The smooth transition did not result in a 
huge reduction among the officers and NCOs in spite of the enormous downsizing of the 
military. Basically, the same military bureaucracy that existed earlier organized the 
reduction, but in the most developed countries, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, 
the decline of the market economy helped to “solve” the problem by offering more 
attractive careers than the military. Notwithstanding, the institutions of military education 
made serious efforts to integrate democracy-related subjects into the agenda. 
Furthermore, NATO, the United States, Canada, and European countries, first of all 
                                                 
14 J. J. Linz and A. Stepan: 7. 
15 Daniel N. Nelson, Civil Armies, Civil Societies, and NATO’s Enlargement (Armed Forces and 
Society, Fall 1998 Vol. 25. No. 1.) 145. 
10 
Germany and Great Britain, offered education and training programs, which improved 
the effectiveness of the democratization of the officer corps.  
The horizontal aspect of democratic control of the military received much less 
attention from domestic and foreign experts. However, drawing attention to the 
horizontal aspect of democratic control is important for many reasons, but fundamentally 
because of the crucial role of civil society and NGOs in democratic consolidation. 
B. THE HORIZONTAL ASPECT OF THE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF 
MILITARY - CIVIL SOCIETY AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL 
ORGANIZATIONS  
A. Stepan and J. J. Linz emphasize the vital role of civil society in democratic 
consolidation. They state that if a functioning state exists, other interconnected and 
mutually reinforcing conditions must also exist or be crafted for a democracy to be 
consolidated, and they state that the free and lively civil society is the first condition.16 
The civil society was defined as an arena of the polity: 
…where self-organizing groups, movements, and intellectuals, relatively 
autonomous from the state, attempt to articulate values, create associations 
and solidarities, and advance their interests.17   
Although there are many definitions of civil society18 and debates about this 
field,19 it seems reasonable to use the definition of Linz and Stepan. Referring to the 
Hungarian post-communist context, however, Patricia Chilton’s definition draws 
attention to an important feature of civil society. She pointed out that in a totalitarian, and 
in the case of Hungary an authoritarian context, civil society defines itself in opposition 
to the state. For this reason, Eastern European literature often makes a sharp distinction 
between state and non-state (civil society). As she argues: 
In the broader context, state/civil society distinctions are not so sharp, but 
the concept still holds. Civil society exists through self-organized activity, 
                                                 
16 J. J. Linz and A. Stepan: 7. 
17 J. J. Linz and A. Stepan: 7. 
18 A. Arato: 314. Larry Dimond, Developing Democracy Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1999) 218-260. A. Körösényi: 162-163.  Krishan Kumar, Civil Társadalom 
(Civil Society) in: Mozgó Világ 1992. 7. (Hungarian leading periodical on social sciences). 
19 Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 
1992) 1-26. 
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not dependent upon the agency of the state for its initiation and day-to-day 
management, but on the free associations of individuals.20 
Thus, the definition of Linz and Stepan coincides with the mainstream theories 
and helps to distinguish the actors of the political society, such as political parties, from 
the subgroups of civil society and the NGOs. Before tentatively classifying the 
organizations in terms of horizontal control, it is worth paying attention to the various 
civil activities that have roles in promoting the consolidation of the democratic civil-
military relations. 
L. Diamond definitively pointed out how civil society promotes democratic 
development and consolidation.21 He described thirteen ways directly or indirectly linked 
to civil-military relations or even to the control of the armed forces. Focusing on 
democratic control, it is worth mentioning the following:  
• The basic function of civil society is to control the state, the democratic 
political institutions. More exactly: 
After the transition, this [civil society] involves checking, monitoring, and 
restraining the exercise of power by formally democratic states and 
holding them accountable to the law and public expectations of 
responsible government.22 
• Here, he argues that civil society has “checking and limiting” functions, 
which are particularly important when corruption is flourishing as it 
generally does, and states abuse their power. It is important to emphasize 
here that defense procurement and downsizing of the armed forces are 
some of the most sensitive areas. It is especially true after the Cold War as 
the radical shrinking and restructuring of the military is a reality.  
• Certain national and international civil organizations, independently or in 
cooperation with state-financed schools, have direct educational functions. 
Reforming curricula and writing standards for teachers, and creating new 
instructional materials concerning democratic values and behaviors, 
clearly shows that civil society roles go beyond merely checking, 
criticizing and resisting the state. For example, in Hungary, the 
Association of History Teachers organized a lecture series about security 
affairs and democratic civil-military relations.  
                                                 
20 Patricia Chilton, “Mechanics of Change: Social Movements, Transnational Coalitions, and the 
Transformation Process in Eastern Europe” (in: Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed. Bringing Transnational 
Relations Back in Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 195. 
21 L. Diamond: 239-250. 
22 L. Diamond: 239. 
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• The activity of civil society affects the “transition from clientism to 
citizenship”23 at the local level. The local activity concerning military 
training or the appearance of the military in towns was absolutely limited 
under totalitarian or authoritarian regimes. However, military activity in 
peacetime directly affected, and still affects, certain regions and towns in 
countries. Democracy gave citizens the right to express their local interests 
and it is embodied as a certain local control over military activity, which at 
least forces the military to follow the regulations in order to accept 
responsibility for the probable unintended results of their activity, such as 
polluting the environment. 
• Pluralistic civil society generates a wide range of interests that may cut 
across the principal polarities of political conflict. In this instance, 
Diamond refers to the issue-oriented movements, which “draw together 
new constituencies that cut across long standing regional, religious, ethnic 
or partisan cleavages.”24 Important civil groups can be mentioned which 
were suppressed under the non-democratic regimes, and became legal 
during the democratization process. However, most of them, such as 
pacifist and anti-conscription movements, are rarely welcomed by defense 
authorities. They monitor the activity of the military and some parts of the 
defense-related decision making process, which are important according to 
their concerns (disarmament, enforcing human rights, reforming 
conscription etc.). 
• Civil society widely disseminates information and so empowers citizens in 
the collective pursuit and defense of their interests and values. This civil 
activity, according to Diamond, is particularly true in debates over military 
and national security policies because of the lack of public knowledge in 
this field.  
Besides civil society, some of the NGOs also have relations with the military and 
have roles in the democratic control over the armed forces. In this respect, different NGO 
activities can be mentioned which are more or less connected to civil society activities. 
Three main types of the NGOs’ activities should be mentioned here. Humanitarian 
activity which is typical during the new military missions, such as peacekeeping 
missions, interest representation inside the military, and defense-related academic 
research activities outside the defense establishment. Last, but not least, media activities 
have an enormous role concerning defense-related decision making, peacetime military 
training, and wartime or peace support activities. Although it is very significant, it is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
                                                 
23 Jonathan Fox’s expression cited by L. Diamond: 244.   
24 L. Diamond: 245. 
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The horizontal aspect of the democratic control of the armed forces can be 
summarized as referring to those organizations which are relatively independent from the 
political parties and the executive power, and fully or partly concentrate on defense 
matters. They have some level of competence and have opinions concerning defense and 
military-related issues, and their opinions and/or values are expressed in various ways. 
Most of these organizations, such as the independent think tanks, simply did not 
exist under the authoritarian system in Hungary. Others, such as the significant part of the 
media under communism, had not dealt with military-related issues. And some of them 
were illegal movements such as the movements against compulsory military service. 
A different classification can be stated concerning the organizations, which have 
roles in the horizontal control over the military. In accordance with their activities and the 
strength of the relation with the state, a tentative classification seems to be necessary for 
better understanding civil-military relations, and for further research. These are: 
international non-governmental organizations, trade unions (military and civil in the 
military), research and education centers, defense-related cultural organizations, and 
protest groups.  
The first group is the international “big” NGOs (Red Cross, Amnesty 
International) whose role is to monitor how the armed forces maintain human rights and 
individual freedoms. These organizations have rather important roles in non-democratic 
or poorly consolidated systems or during military operations. These organizations 
basically do not depend on the state as they are strongly embedded in the international 
system and are financially independent.   
The second group is the trade unions and “union-like” organizations in the 
military. These organizations are employees’ interest groups focusing on working and 
living conditions, but also “internal” control groups monitoring how the military 
organization maintains the rule of law. The latter is particularly important in new 
democracies where leaders have not had much experience with democracies and easily 
break the law; whether intentionally or unintentionally is not important. Whenever there 
is a conscription system, the abuse of power is an everyday aspect in the life of 
conscripts. These are self-organized organizations, but strongly depend on the state which 
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regulates the rights of the military and civilian employees in the military and national 
traditions.  
The next group is the universities, think tanks, independent research and educator 
institutes. These actors embody the intellectual basis of democratic control outside the 
state. In these organizations, intellectuals can monitor, interpret and evaluate what 
happens in the field of civil-military relations. They have a certain knack for 
understanding and evaluating the various legal, economic, political, organizational and 
social aspects of questions, and problems or tensions in civil-military conflicts and in 
defense-related decision-making processes. These organizations partly depend on the 
state and provide experts to the political society. Furthermore, these organizations can be 
characterized as being in a constant state of flux, which means that there is mobility 
between both civil society and political society and vice versa. 
The defense-related cultural organizations, which are more or less state initiated, 
but definitely non-state actor organizations in this field, constitute another group. These 
organizations have important roles in maintaining dynamic connections between the 
military or generally defense-related issues and society. They help to preserve defense 
traditions, either nationally or locally, and they seek information about the military. In 
this way, they disseminate information about the military and at the same time encourage 
citizens to deal with defense issues. The role of these organizations is particularly 
important when all-voluntary forces exist and when the presence of the military is very 
limited due to permanent downsizing.  In some of the post-communist countries, such as 
the Czech Republic and Hungary, the society is alienated from military-related defense 
issues due to the permanent historical failures of the military, to the communist 
experience, and to the relative peaceful feature of the post-Cold War era. 
Finally, the protest movements and organizations play a significant role in 
controlling the military. These organizations generally oppose increasing defense 
budgets, certain weapon systems or arms, and compulsory military service. 
Consequently, these are self-organized organizations, and are independent of the state. 
They pursue all information about the military and other defense issues and have certain 
considerations about them. They also disseminate information about defense/military 
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issues and make the public aware of military activities and defense-related decisions. 
They are continuously monitoring how the military and politicians maintain the rule of 
law during their activities and encourage citizens to deal with defense-related issues.  
C. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE HORIZONTAL ASPECT 
The security sector, and thus the controlling security-related organizations, are 
primarily states’ prerogatives.25 Nevertheless, an active defense-related civil society and 
set of NGOs can improve the quality of the democratic CMR. Consequently, the 
marginalization of this aspect of the CMR is unjustified.  
There are at least two main reasons that need to be emphasized in order to 
increase awareness about this aspect of democratic control over the military. The first 
relates to democratic values and democratic consolidation in new democracies. The 
second refers to the new trends in civil-military relations in the post-Cold War era.  
1. Democratic Values and Democratic Consolidation in New 
Democracies 
When discussing the first reason, it can be stated that civil society played a 
significant role during the democratic transition process and particularly in Hungary, 
Poland and Czechoslovakia. Hungary had a rich, and even partly legal, associative life in 
the 1980s. The vast majority of this activity related to political, legal, and economic 
discussions and negotiations, but a portion touched upon military issues, such as 
alternative military service or military service objection. Later, during the negotiations 
concerning democratic transition between the democratic opposition and the Hungarian 
Socialist and Workers Party, the opposition, essentially the representatives of the 
illegal/semi-legal civil society, expressed concerns about the military. 
Nevertheless, at the beginning of the democratic transition, the largest part of this 
civil society converted to the political society. According to P. Schmitter, during the 
consolidation, the civil society’s energies and issues were largely co-opted by the newly 
established parties, class associations and specialized public agencies.26 Consequently, 
the civil society has become weaker, but at the same time, it became legal.  
                                                 
25 Marina Caparini: Concept of a Working Group on Civil Society (manuscript) (Geneva: DECAF, 
2001) 5. 
26 Philippe C. Schmitter, The Consolidation of Political Democracies: Processes, Rhythms, Sequences 
and Types (in: Geoffrey Pridham ed. Transition to Democracy Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1995) 553. 
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To be more exact, as Attila Ágh pointed out, civil society has developed quickly 
in East Central Europe during the transition. However, the normative meaning of civil 
society (which presumes a strong middle-class being able to be significantly independent 
from the state redistribution) must be separated from its analytical function. In the 
normative sense, as exemplified by the developed Western societies, civil society does 
not exist in East Central Europe, but in the analytical sense, it does.27 
Although the early 1990’s can be described as a boom for civil organizations in 
Hungary, civil society had not been much concerned with the military. As a result, after 
the transition period, the part of civil-society that has focused on the military or even 
defense issues, has been very weak.  
In Hungary, just as in other post-communist countries, the older historical and 
later communist associations and societies that cared about defense traditions 
disappeared. This fact is, together with the lack of a direct external military threat and 
post-modern socio-cultural changes such as individualization and identity-related 
changes,28 crucial when discussing the weak public support for and interest in defense 
issues. 
Civilian intellectuals rarely deal with defense issues at universities and non-
governmental research institutes in Hungary. However, civil society, and especially this 
part of civil society, can be the primary source of civilian experts. It is a vital problem 
because all of these countries lack civilian experts at ministries of defense and in the 
legislatures. Another problem is that the few newly established institutes rarely fulfil this 
function. As W. Jacoby pointed out, Central and Eastern European elites have often 
imitated public institutional structures that presume the existence of these non-state 
actors, which private Western foundations, Western states and international organizations 
are scrambling to promote.29  
                                                 
27 Attila Ágh, Emerging Democracies in East Central Europe and the Balkans, (Northampton: 
Edward Elgar, 1998) 21. 
28 Stefan Sarvas gives a good summary of these and their affects on the relationship between the 
state/the military and the public. Stefan Sarvas, Public Perceptions of Security and the Military in the 
Czech Republic (http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/96-98/sarvas.pdf) 12. 
29 Wade Jacoby, Tutors and Pupils: International Organizations, Central European Elites, and 
Western Models (in: Governance: An international Journal of Policy and Administration, Vol. 14, No. 2, 
April 2001) 176. 
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Although most of the publications celebrate the success of the rapid 
democratization of civil-military relations in many post-communist countries, 
deficiencies are quite obvious. Not every military-related problem particularly affects 
Hungary, but as D. N. Nelson emphasized in 1998, criminality, procurement corruption, 
minimal civilian presence or control, disaffection from the public and low compliance by 
top military leaders to civilian authority affected all aspirants for NATO membership.30 
These phenomena definitely call for greater transparency and control in which the non-
state actors should have a crucial role. 
2. New Trends in Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Cold War Era 
The second reason for attention to horizontal control that needs to be discussed is 
new trends in civil-military relations in the post-Cold War era.  In the post-Cold War era, 
new security threats have risen and the so-called traditional threats, which ultimately 
offered reasons for maintaining mass armed forces, disappeared. The new threats, mainly 
subregional, subnational conflicts, called for new types of military missions, and thus the 
reorganization of the military. As a result, one of the consequences is that the “military 
participation ratio”31 in the societies rapidly declined. The armed forces have become 
smaller and more professional. Furthermore, the more developed new democracies 
demonstrate features similar to those of advanced capitalist societies, which are evolving 
in the direction of “post-military societies.” Therefore, the structural balance between 
welfare and warfare in society has shifted towards the former.32 As a result, public 
attitudes towards defense issues, and especially towards the military, are rather skeptical 
or apathetic.33   
Although, the convergence between the civil and military sectors is also 
identifiable, such as the role of the media, officers’ civilian education, etc., the defense-
related decision-making process became more exclusive. This exclusiveness can be 
                                                 
30 D. N. Nelson: 153. 
31 Stanislav Andreski, Military Organization and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1968) 33. 
32 Martin Shaw’s idea is cited by David Held and Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan 
Perraton, Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1999) 137.  
33 Charles C. Moskos and James Burk, The Postmodern Military in: James Burk ed., The Adaptive 
Military (New Brunswick: Transaction Publisher, 1998) 169. 
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reinforced by the mutual civil-military cooperation in the ministries because of the 
competition for state-owned and international (NATO, EU) resources.  
All the aforementioned issues call for a broader understanding of civil-military 
relations, and emphasize the significance of the horizontal elements which can improve 
the democratic nature of this relationship. It also calls for examining the non-
governmental, horizontal aspect of democratic control over the military. At the same 
time, these necessarily draw attention to those conditions in Hungary, and probably in 
other new democracies, where civil society already has rights, but is lacking the 
capability to improve the control over and the transparency of the military and the entire 
defense sector. 
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III. PRECONDITIONS AND DOMESTIC STEPS TOWARDS 
DEMOCRATIC CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
This chapter describes the transition period of the horizontal aspect of civil-
military relations from the late state-party to the democratic system in Hungary. It gives a 
general overview of the demobilized political life of late communism that focuses on the 
main feature of the civil-military relations and the role of the civil society in it. This 
chapter argues that the military-related civil society activity was limited and a significant 
gap became obvious between the society and the military at the beginning of 
democratization. It also emphasizes, however, that protest organizations continued their 
activity as a legal part of the Hungarian social-political life and new horizontal actors 
appeared geared towards the military, such as cultural and research/advisor organizations. 
All of these non-governmental organizations influenced in some degree the 
democratization of civil-military relations by articulating certain groups’ values and 
opinions and by offering intellectual capabilities about military issues. 
A. STATE-PARTY SYSTEM AND MILITARY-RELATED CIVIL SOCIETY 
IN THE LATE 1980S  
Hungarian civil society, as typical of the Soviet bloc phenomenon, was illegal and 
inherently against the communist system. Intellectuals organized their activities and 
worked out scenarios for transforming the system into a democratic or at least a 
somewhat democratic system that kept a very significant distance from Moscow in the 
1980s. At the same time, military-related civil activities were merely anti-militarist and 
against compulsory military service.  
Since their activity was contrary to the existing law and connected to human 
rights, their well-known activists were jailed from time to time just as were other 
members active in civil society. Perhaps for this reason, the anti-military activists 
maintained good relationships with churches and the illegal liberal opposition.34 
Although reform of the compulsory military service started in the second half of the 
1980s mainly as one of the consequences of the Gorbachev-era, civil society had raised 
                                                 
34  Military service objectors were partly religious objectors such as Jehovah witnesses, Nazarenes, 
Reform-Adventists, the “Bokor” catholic community or political objectors. All of them received a 10-36 
month sentence before 1989. In: Tamás Csapodi, “A polgári szolgálat története” (The Story of Civilian 
Service) Új Generácio, November 20. 2001. 
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the necessity and strongly supported these reforms. Civil society disseminated 
information concerning military service-related tensions at the domestic and international 
level. The tools used were mainly the illegal networks and samisdat papers such as 
“Bokor”, “Demokratikus Ellenzék” (Democratic Opposition), “Karácsonyi Ajándék” 
(Christmas Present), “Égtájak” (Cardinal Points), and Beszélő. Additionally, there was a 
mass demonstration dedicated to freeing military service objectors next to the Parliament 
building in 1988. As a result of this influence, the Hungarian media started to deal with 
the  “Zsolt Keszthelyi issue”, named for one of the political objectors who was 
imprisoned, and Amnesty International also drew international attention to it by giving 
“The Political Prisoner of Month” title to Keszthelyi in April 1988.35 
Anti-military activities reached their most significant goal in 1989 as a result of 
the aforementioned activities. After a longstanding, and mainly non-public debate,36 the 
military officials, obviously with the agreement of the Hungarian Socialist and Workers 
Party, were willing to work out the system of alternative military service. The final 
decision in 1989 made it possible for male citizens to choose civilian service instead of 
armed military service. Although this result was remarkable, civil activities in this field 
still exist in Hungary, with a modified agenda aiming at all voluntary military service.  
No other civil activity with relations to the military occurred in the 1980s. State-
party institutions completely covered and controlled all other potential areas of civil 
society activity. Monitoring military life or participating in decision-making processes 
was out of the question. The Communist Party and the Political Department of the 
Hungarian Peoples Army strictly organized the social-military connections in every sense 
in accordance with specific Party decisions.37  
                                                 
35 Tamás Csapodi, Katonai szolgálatmegtagadás itthon es külföldön, különös tekintettel a kelet-
európai régióra, PhD dissertation, (Budapest, 1991). 
36 The debate became legitimate after the bill of rights of association (1989.II. tv.). Then the newly 
established political parties, developed from earlier illegal/semi-legal civil networks and organizations, 
articulated their opinion about it. For example, on 4 May 1989, Miklos Szabó, the leader of the Alliance of 
Free Democrats (SZDSZ) openly called for diminishing compulsory military service. Honvéd 
Eseménynaptár 1989 (Budapest: Honvédelmi Minisztérium, 1990) 8; Later, the main Hungarian papers 
intensively dealt with the problems of military service that had been unprecedented. (Magyar Hirlap, 30 
June 1989; Magyar Nemzet, 8 August 1989). 
37 The relating Party decision, approved in March 1967, was in effect until 1989. 
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The state established and organized “National Peace-Committee” (Országos 
Béketanács) neutralized the potential public though not illegal anti-militarist or peace 
activities and movements. The “National Home Defense Association” (Magyar 
Honvédelmi Szövetség), subordinated to the MOD, organized defense-related activities 
among youth such as vehicle driving training, practicing shooting, parachuting and 
diving. The Party and the Political Department actively managed the military-related 
social and cultural life on the national and local level as well. The military was deeply 
involved in these activities, and military leaders and Party activists had to report the 
results and problems regularly to a certain level of the Party bureaucracy. The desired 
goals of these activities were to strengthen the relationship between the Party, the military 
and society. Parts of the Hungarian national-defense traditions were able to exist only in 
this institutional framework and naturally in a restricted way before 1989.  
The transformation of the system became obvious in 1989 as a result of the 
democratization process that began in the late 1980s when the reform communists and 
the “semi-illegal” liberal opposition, as representatives of civil society, negotiated the 
method of transition. During these negotiations, the two sides worked out the basic 
institutions and rules of the transition process in Hungary. Hungary was building a 
democratic political system, and democratic control of the armed organizations, including 
the military, the police and the border guards, embodied an integral part of this effort. At 
this point, the conversion of civil society, which existed mainly to oppose the communist 
system, had started and formulated the new political society in Hungary.38  
These circumstances have defined the long-standing conceptual disputes about 
civil society in Hungary, in which civil society has been understood to be a more lively 
linkage between the state and society rather than merely the opposition or a tool of the 
current ruling parties. Beyond these disputes, new political parties have been reluctant to 
accept that they have not already embodied civil society. The current ruling parties 
continuously make efforts to keep the emerging civil society under their guidance and 
enjoy the fact that the private sector is too weak to finance such social self-organization.  
                                                 
38 The key issue was that the Parliament, as a necessary condition for the first free elections, passed 
the bill on rights of association (1989. II. tv.). It created a legal background for establishing political parties 
as well as social organizations. (http://www.civil.info.hu/). 
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At the same time, the new features of civil society started to take shape in the 
early 1990s. As far as military-related civil society is concerned, new forms of activities 
and organizations soon started to form. However, most of these have not been able to 
exist without state support and a significant portion of the civil society activities have not 
been “grassroots” in nature. 
B. THE FOUNDATIONS OF DEMOCRATIC CIVIL-MILITARY 
RELATIONS AND THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
The decision to pursue democratic civil-military relations instead of the 
communist style of state-party-military and society-military relations was strictly a 
domestic issue in Hungary. However, this decision was made in the international context 
of the end of the Cold War. Fearful that the communists would hinder the democratic 
transition by using force, the “semi-illegal” liberal opposition started to press the 
communist party and its government to secure democratic changes. The ruling 
communists were cooperative to some degree.39 However, in an attempt to preserve 
communist supervision over the Armed Forces, the communists separated the Ministry of 
Defense and the Command of the Hungarian Defense Forces (General Staff) in December 
1989.40 This separation proved to be one of the most difficult obstacles to developing 
civilian control over the military.  
The Ministry of Defense was subordinated to the prime minister and the 
command of the armed forces was subordinated to the president. The institution of the 
president was created at that time in Hungary. The role of the commander in chief of the 
armed forces was given to the newly created position of president. According to a widely 
shared opinion, the reform communist, Imre Pozsgai, had the best chance of being elected 
president. However, in the 1990 presidential election, Pozsgai was not elected. Neither 
the president nor the government was under communist influence in 1990. Nevertheless, 
the actual command of the armed forces remained purely in military hands under the 
Commander of the Home Defense Forces without any effective institutional contact with 
the Ministry of Defense. Although this last communist decision concerning the system of 
                                                 
39 The Hungarian communist party (MSZMP) withdrew the party from the military and canceled the 
communist prerogatives in the promotion system. Earlier, the MSZMP was deeply involved in and 
controlled the military decision making process at every level of the military organization. 
40 Jeffrey Simon, Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion (Washington: 
National Defense University, McNair Papers 39, 1995) 86. 
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military subordination was permanently modified, with the goal of guaranteeing the basic 
requirements of democratic civilian control, it resulted in a longstanding civil-military 
and political debate in Hungary. The integration of the two entities became an issue in the 
mid-1990s,41 and was finally resolved by the integration of the two entities in the fall of 
2001.42 
The modified constitution in 1989, followed by the new Defense Act 
(1990/XXI.)43 and free elections in 1990, guaranteed the basic elements of civilian 
control over the Hungarian armed forces. Later, several amendments, modifications, and 
more importantly, military reform in 1992 and the new Defense Act (1993/CX)44 resulted 
in democratic and effective45 control over the Hungarian military and gave more rights to 
the government and consequently, to the Ministry of Defense. Various, mainly 
procedural, problems had arisen and had been solved by the governments up to the mid-
1990s but significant deficiencies had also remained. The decade-long goal concerning 
civil-military relations had been partly achieved. 
Although democratic control has formally existed since the early 1990s in 
Hungary, the consolidation of democratic control of the armed forces involved improving 
the quality of the existing methods of control.  
During the early 1990s, in parallel with the formulation of the new legal and state 
structures of democratic civil-military relations, the illegal forms of civil activity became 
legalized and new forms also appeared. The legalized activities included the protest, both 
anti-military and anti-conscription, movements, and the new activities seemed to cover 
all the other options with different levels of intensity and success.  
                                                 
41 British experts carried out research on civilian control over the military in 1996 and they told the 
Hungarian MOD that the integration of the GS and the MOD was necessary. The MOD started to work on 




45 Before reform in 1992, the executive power could exert authority over the armed forces only in a 
slow and complicated way. It resulted in significant problems concerning national defense during the civil 
war in Yugoslavia. However, the significant power of the president secured the peaceful resolution of 
tensions between the society and the government during the transportation blockade (transporters blocked 
all the main roads protesting against that the government introduced high gas prices without negotiations in 
October 1990) when changes to the system began because the president was able to reject the use of force. 
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1. Protest Movements 
Two protest movements/organizations have been well known in Hungary in this 
area: the ALBA Circle (Nonviolence Movement for Peace), and HEL (Liege Against 
Conscription). One other, known mainly only in particular communities such as protest 
activists, was the Bokor Catholic Basis-community.  
They are quite different in their values and policies. The Bokor community is a 
religious-based community against any kind of violence, but it has not had very much 
effect on civil-military relations. However, it disseminates anti-violence information and 
popularizes anti-military activities in religious communities. The ALBA Circle is a 
pacifist organization which regularly articulates anti-military and anti-conscription 
opinions. It has participated in global networks and has paid attention to Hungarian 
aspects of global peace actions. HEL is formally not an organization but a civil 
movement against compulsory military service. HEL appears often in the media because 
of the lively debates on conscription. These classic organizations have remarkable 
Internet activities.46 The ALBA Circle and HEL have been “watchdogs” of military 
activities.  
These protest movements could act publicly in accordance with their values. They 
could negotiate and/or discuss small arms, military service and human rights issues with 
officials. They could legally demonstrate47 and express their opinions in the media. The 
protest organizations appeared in the media and collected the signature of citizens against 
the liberalization of the possession of arms and compulsory military service in 1991. In 
the same year, the protest organizations established the “Anti-Violence Forum” and they 
demonstrated for peace because of the civil war in Yugoslavia.48  
The protest organizations had reasonable hopes to attain some of their goals 
because of severe downsizing in the military and the improving democracy, but the 
                                                 
46 See: www.albakor.hu, www.bokor.hu, and http://www.c3.hu/~farkashe/hel/index.html. 
47 An anarchist group demonstrated in front of the MOD on 14 November 1990. Honvéd 
Eseménynaptár 1990 (Budapest: Honvédelmi Minisztérium, 1990) 87. 
48 http://www.c3.hu/%7Efarkashe/eef/index.html. 
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rapidly declining defense budget49 made an all-voluntary force an impossible option. 
Nevertheless, the fortunate timing of organizational and demographic changes helped to 
modify the conscription system by making it more tolerant. The military was shrinking50 
while the number of young males was increasing greatly51 in the first half of the 1990s. It 
created a situation in which the length and the conditions of the alternative military 
service were negotiable. 
Additionally, the democracy that was consolidating increasingly cared about 
human rights and, at a minimum, the human rights-related military issues were widely 
discussed52 and the military was more and more concerned about the treatment of 
conscripts. Nevertheless, the unclear international order and security circumstances, the 
weak budget, as well as deep existing emotions about the freely elected conservative 
government concerning the creation of a new national military with conscription did not 
support their efforts.  The “the military is the school of nation” idea has once again 
emerged. To sum up, in this period, the protest movements became a legal part of the 
civil-military relations and fulfilled their roles in controlling the military, disseminating 
military-related information, and encouraging the citizens to participate in military and/or 
defense discussions even in small circles.53 
2. National Defense Culture-Related Organizations 
The national defense culture-related organizations appeared quite soon as a result 
of the activities of those demobilized and retired soldiers who had served in the 
                                                 
49 The real value of the defense budget fell to 54% (1992) and then to 49% (1994) compared with the 
value in 1988. Haderő-átalakítás (The Transforming Military) 1995-1998-2008. (Budapest, Ministry of 
Defense, 1998). 
50 155 thousand soldiers served in the Hungarian military in 1989. It shrank to 100 thousand in four 
years. Mihály Bak, “A honvédség útja a leépülés felé” Világgazdaság, Melléklet 2000 nyár 
http://www.vilaggazdasag.hu/mellekl/egyeb/rendszervalto/cikk07.sht. 
51 A minister, whose last name was Ratko, forbade abortion for a few years during the 1950’s. It 
caused a very significant second demographic wave at the very end of the 1980’s and early 1990’s which 
has popularly been referred to as “Ratko’s grandchildren”. 
52 The Military Court convicted two officers of abusing power against conscripts in Szeged (a city in 
southern Hungary), in August 1991. Honvéd Eseménynaptár 1991 (Budapest: Honvédelmi Minisztérium, 
1993) 130. 
53 Although protest organizations encompass only a few hundred activists, officials have had to care 
about them. These organizations are deeply embedded in international advocacy networks. It can be proved 
that the international meeting of military service objectors was held in Budapest in 1991, a year after the 
first free elections. László Csendes, “Hadseregtörténet 1945-1998” (Új Honvédségi Szemle, Különkiadás, 
1998) 142. 
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communist regime. They pursued their legal and ethical rehabilitation54 as well as the 
revitalization of the almost forgotten traditions since most of these people had endured 
serious insults and grievances during the communist regime. The rehabilitation of former 
soldiers, pre-communist organizations, and the establishment of new organizations 
occurred at the same time.  
The legal formulation of these rather small organizations, just as all the other civil 
organizations, began in 1992 when the relevant governmental decree became effective.55 
Since 1992, thousands of civil organizations have been established but just a few that 
focus on national defense issues. Actually, many more challenging fields existed at that 
time than national defense around which mobilized people to create organizations. The 
main issue was the representation of interests as a result of restructuring the economy. 
However, the downsizing of the military and the reorganization of social connections of 
the military generated new forms of activities in social-military relations as the 
foundations of the system became effective in 2000.  
In addition to the rehabilitated soldiers’ organizations as self-organized 
organizations appeared. The first two were established in the two cities of Jánoshalma 
and Jászberény for saving the integrity of the former retired and recently demobilized 
military communities and also their integration into local society. They started to practice 
an unprecedented two-way communication with the local society and with the military 
and pursued their interests, such us having meetings for people and their families who 
had served in the military, providing cultural programs, and disseminating defense-
related traditions and information locally. Although they pioneered new forms of 
activities based on self-organization, the vast majority of the activities of these 
organizations involved just trying to stay afloat and only a few hundred people were 
involved. 
                                                 
54 Történelmi Igazságtétel Bizottság Katonai Szekcioja (Committee for Historical Justice Military 
Section) was probably the most effective organization in this field. It represented about 20,000 former 
professional military men and policemen who were discriminated against after the 1956 revolution. The 
Committee has requested permanent full rehabilitation with governments. 
55 114/1992. (VII. 23.) Decree of Government. This decree, in accordance with the bill (1989 II.), 
defined the framework of nonprofit organizations. 
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In spite of the emergence of these new activities the external social integration 
and the internal cohesion of the military declined remarkably in the early 1990s due to 
the transformation of the social and economic system. The communist as well as the 
prewar system became weak and/or remained ungrounded. The new endeavors were 
feeble and lacked support from both the state and citizens. The tremendous economical 
difficulties caused by restructuring the economy created a situation that was not 
advantageous for developing rather value-oriented social-military relations. 
3. Think-Tank-Like Activity 
Efforts to develop “think-tank-like” activity reflected the serious deficiency in the 
expertise of civilians in the emerging democratic civil-military relations. It was a 
necessity borne out of the basic requirement of the democratic system, namely the 
civilian supremacy. It fundamentally means that democratically elected civilians decide 
on the “immediate operating issues”56 of the military organization. It also has had to 
appear in the MOD, where government appointees are presumed to have certain military-
related expertise. Nevertheless, the difficulty encountered in Hungary was the absolute 
lack of such expertise. In the initial stages of transition, there were no civilians who 
understood the structure of the military, military working mechanisms, or equipment and 
training-related questions. In accordance with the Soviet model, previously military 
people had exclusively filled positions in the MOD during the communist regime; and 
only military people dealt with military issues. Anton A. Bebler candidly characterized 
the results of the early “civilianization” of the young democracies:  
Due to the peculiarities of ‘transition' and to the shallowness of 
democratization in the region the advent of civilian defense ministers was 
followed also by packing up the top layer of defense ministries with 
insufficiently qualified personnel. Even outright incompetent, civilian 
political activists, belonging or being close to the defense minister’s party 
or to the circle of his personnel associates and cronies found employment 
in the ministry.57 
                                                 
56 These are the quantitative (size, recruitment, etc.), the qualitative (composition, equipment, etc.) and 
the dynamic (utilization) issues of the military. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The 
Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 1985) 1. 
57 Anton A. Bebler, ed., Civil-Military Relations in Post Communist States, Central and Eastern 
Europe in Transition (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1997) 75. 
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The obvious weakness of the “vertical” aspect of democratic control over the 
military called for expertise to be imported. Sources could be independent research 
institutes, or academic centers dealing with military-related issues or in other words, non-
governmental organizations accumulating particular knowledge in this field. These 
options did not exist at that time due to the lack of such organizations. Nevertheless, it 
was naturally offered by the military itself, but at that time, the first attempt to be an 
independent expert emerged.  
Undoubtedly, Péter Deák was the first who recognized the need for such an 
institution. He, as a skillful retired colonel with contacts in the civilian intellectual 
society, understood the contemporary defense-related debates, and dilemmas and that the 
new political elite was not at all informed about defense matters.58 As a result, he 
established the first Hungarian “think-tank-like” non-government organization in the 
field of defense, namely the Center for Security and Defense Studies Foundation 
(CSDSF). 
This organization has been working extensively since 1990. Although the 
conventional wisdom holds that this foundation has close ties to the Hungarian Socialist 
Party, all governments and thus the first free elected conservative government, utilized 
the services of the CSDSF. 
The range of the CSDSF’s activities started during the early 1990s, and concluded 
with mainly being organizational and secondly, analytical. Hence, this organization 
offered its members knowledge and their contacts within military and academic circles on 
defense issues. The publications and essays of the CSDSF on contemporary national 
defense questions prove that this NGO was involved in the associated decision making 
process. This organization attracted the attention of state officials on important defense-
                                                 
58 Defense-related matters appeared in the new “transitional ” literature (Kapu, Beszélő, etc) 
approaching the question “What is defense all about after the Warsaw Pact?”, which started him off 
initially in 1990. (Interview with Péter Deák, Research Director of Center for Security and Defense Studies 
Foundation, 12 March 2002). 
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related matters, produced independent professional materials,59 and offered an organizer 
role utilizing its networks.60 
The activities of the CSDSF have not been classic “think-tank” activities since it 
was rather organizational in nature, rather than employing academics in the field of 
defense, conducting research and giving advice to clients. At the same time, it was a kind 
of model for establishing and managing a non-governmental institution in the field of 
defense which was able to be sensitive to defense-related challenges and to mobilize 
intellectual capacities for assisting the executive branch, different bodies of the 
legislature, or even political parties concerning certain topics. 
During the early 1990s, the CSDSF was the only Hungarian, non-governmental 
institution, but other academic activities appeared also under different circumstances. 
Foreign and state-owned institutions started to work in this field, which proved that there 
was a need for such activities. Foreign institutions organized conferences, ordered 
research and published results about the Hungarian national defense field. Foreign non-
governmental and national state-owned agencies cooperated in providing information 
about Hungarian military society and defense institutions.61 All these phenomena have 
raised the question as to whether or not there is a need for non-governmental defense-
related academic activities. 
The answer has been not easy, but several facts were already obvious during the 
early 1990s. The exclusive reliance of the state on state-owned institutions was a leftover 
from the past. The state and the public require information from multiple rather than 
single sources because of the need for reliability. State-governed institutions are usually 
under bureaucratic pressure to present suitable results and alternative views could be 
useful. Alternative ways of looking at defense issues require more civil-society activity.  
                                                 
59 The CSDSF contributed to formulating the Principles of National Defense, the government’s ideas 
concerning creating a military and compulsory military service, and helped to interpret the security-related 
effects of minority questions, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the Gulf War during the early 1990s. 
(CSDSF library documentation). 
60 CSDSF organized conferences: “The Security-Related Aspects of Minorities”(1991), “The 
Technical Innovation and Defense” (1993) (CSDSF library documentation). 
61 Probably the best example was the German Hanns-Seidel Foundation activity in cooperation with 
the MOD, the Zrinyi Miklos Military Academy (today: National Defense University) in 1992-93. 
30 
In summary, the opposition to the communist system was known as civil society 
in Hungary and this social configuration largely created the political society during and 
after the transition. Consequently, the civil society was involved in creating the 
foundations of democratic civil-military relations. The restructuring of social and 
political life resulted in a new vibrant political society and a relatively weak civil society 
during early democratization. However, the number of national non-governmental 
organizations grew rapidly after a government decree in 1992.  
Nevertheless there were not many civil organizations geared towards the military. 
These organizations have had different profiles and operated under different conditions in 
the early 1990s due to their types of activity and legacy. Protest organizations could 
continue their work legally and publicly. They influenced conscription-related debates 
and continuously monitored the military and defense bureaucracy and socialized it to be 
under civilian control. The culture-related organizations were very small and had just 
started to form. There was a vacuum in society-military relations. Neither the communist 
nor the prewar institutions were able to exist under the current circumstances. 
Nevertheless, new types of organizations started to emerge. There was only one “think-
tank-like” organization, which organized the intellectuals supporting the new legislature 
and administration rather than conducting any research. Nevertheless, its relative 
independence from the political sphere helped the new ruling parties to gather alternative 
information about the military and it also helped to open the closed society of the 
military. 
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IV. CONSOLIDATING CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND 
HORIZONTAL ACTORS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE 1990S  
In the early 1990s, Hungary succeeded in setting up legal and organizational 
frameworks for democratic civil-military relations. Beyond the establishment of the rule 
of law and major institutional changes, which are of primary importance, several key 
issues regarding civil-military relations remained to be addressed in the mid-1990s. These 
are related to expertise, procedural routines on both the military and the civilian sides, 
social integration of the military, and professionalization, including depolitization, of the 
officer corps.62 The focus of this chapter will be on the first three issues due to their 
relevance concerning civil society.  
This part of the thesis argues that democratic consolidation of the Hungarian 
CMR was going on and the horizontal actors had some influence on these issues. Crucial 
decisions were made defining the rules of the civil-organizations’ activity and their 
relationship with the state. Non-governmental activity concerning military issues became 
more active and diverse. However, definitive resolutions did not occur in topical military-
related issues. The military-, defense-related expertise mainly remained in military 
personnel’s hands, procedural weaknesses, in close relation to the still separated MOD 
and GS, persisted, and the social integration just slightly developed. Furthermore, the 
significance of preparing for the NATO enlargement drove most of the CMR-related 
activities, including horizontal moves, and it encouraged the state to seek to control the 
life of civil society.  
A. SUCCESSES AND FAILURES IN BUILDING CIVIL-MILITARY 
RELATIONS 
After the second free parliamentary elections in 1994, the social-liberal 
(Hungarian Socialist Party-Alliance of Free Democrats) coalition came to power in 
Hungary. The new government considered the lack of civilian experts at the MOD to be 
an important problem. However, the parliamentary opposition, and NATO and member 
                                                 
62 Tradition and culture can be also mentioned here as important parts of developing civilian expertise 
and the military vocation in a democratic way. See: Rudolf Joó, The Democratic Control of the Armed 
Forces: The Experience of Hungary (Chaillot Paper 23. Paris: Institute for Security Studies Western 
European Union, February 1996) 20. 
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countries as well, strongly and reasonably criticized its answer to this problem.63 The 
new political leadership preferred military and/or ex-military personnel, which seemed to 
be partly an answer for the incompetence during the previous MOD64 and partially 
proved the good relationship between the military leadership and the Socialist Party, the 
successor party of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party. Although the new leadership 
undoubtedly accepted the democratic rules, the so-called “militarization” of the Ministry, 
was a fact. The new minister was a retired colonel, György Keleti, and he replaced 
leading civilian personnel with military or former military generals and officers. 
(Administrative state secretary Rudolf Joo was replaced by BG Jozsef Feher, and 
Economy and Budget deputy administrative state secretary Sandor Turjan was replaced 
by MG Karoly Janza. Military personnel also took over department level positions.65) 
Besides being strongly criticized about these decisions, the dilemma remained 
concerning who could run the MOD correctly, either civilians without certain knowledge 
of the military, or military personnel. However, the new minister stated that he would act 
as a politician and not as a former career soldier,66 and as a matter of fact, fiscal 
pragmatism was the main driving force during the governance of the social-liberal 
coalition. Nevertheless, the answer, preferring military experts instead of civilians, was 
controversial. First of all, the democratic requirement concerning civilian political 
leadership could not be neglected because of a lack of expert civilians. Secondly, 
scandals in relation to the new minister’s decisions highlighted the weakness of 
maintaining democratic procedures. (Two scandals shook the MOD in 1996. The first 
was in March. The Minister of Defense decided to buy 100 T-72 tanks from Belorussia 
without properly checking with the Defense Committee of the Parliament.67 The second 
was in May when Hungarian military airplanes left the country for international exercises 
                                                 
63 “Főtisztes polgárok”, Heti Világgazdaság (Hungarian weekly) (12. November 1994); British experts 
criticized the ratio of military personnel in the top layer of Hungarian MOD in: “A honvédség civil 
ellenőrzése”, Heti Világgazdaság (22 February 1997). 
64 MG Károly Janza, who was the chief economist at the MOD, claimed experts are even military 
personnel instead of amateurs. In: “Válaszol Janza Károly vezérőrnagy a HM főközgazdásza”, Heti 
Világgazdaság (01 October 1994). 
65 Jeffrey Simon, Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion (Washington: 
National Defense University, McNair Papers 39, 1995) 100-102. 
66 Interview with Gyorgy Keleti, Nepszabadsag, 30 June 1994, FIBIS-EEU-94-127 (1 July 1994) 15.  
67 Heti Világgazdaság (06 April, 1996). 
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without the permission of the Parliament.)68 Finally the politicization of the military elite 
has been undesirable. 
The proper answer calls for civilian experts, in addition to other issues, such as a 
clear distinction between military and civilian responsibilities, a culture of cooperation 
between the Ministry and the General Staff, and standardized bureaucratic procedures. 
Politics, civil society, and the MOD equally could be a source of expert civilians. 
However, nothing seemed to encourage the civilianization of defense-related knowledge 
until the middle 1990s. 
Besides the lack of civilian experts and procedural deficiencies, structural 
problems were the focus of debates on civil-military relations. The bureaucracies of the 
MOD and the General Staff, which had become separate entities in 1989, grew and 
produced parallel working functions which sometimes competed with each other.69 
Furthermore, the military activities were not transparent to the MOD and especially to the 
Parliament. This particular problem has been one of the most important difficulties 
concerning democratic control over the armed forces, but has also been influential in 
bureaucratic and academic debates. Foreign and domestic NGOs joined the discussion as 
it has had political, legal, administrative and organizational aspects. Although this issue 
intensified discussion, the main impetus accelerating civil-military relations was 
undoubtedly the prospect of NATO enlargement. At the same time, NATO enlargement 
drew attention to society’s low level of interest in defense-related issues. It became 
obvious in 1997 because the government promised a referendum on joining NATO but 
polls showed that the level of social interest about NATO was so low that it could 
endanger the primary political goal of joining the Alliance.70 
By the end 1997, as a consequence of the NATO launch PfP program in 199471 
and officially inviting Hungary to join NATO in 1997,72 NATO enlargement was the 
                                                 
68 Heti Világgazdaság (22 May, 1996). 
69 The parallel working functions and oversized leading top layer was a fact in spite of the 
reorganizations and downsizing in 1994-1995. The shrinking at the MOD was a result of the Financial 
Minister’s decision concerning ministries. Magyar Hirlap (3 December, 1994) 5. 
70 The Washington Post 06 November, 1997. 
71 After the Clinton administration finalized the concept of the Partnership for Peace, the Alliance 
launched it in January 1994. 
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main subject of defense-related civil society activity such as protests and popularization 
activities. NATO itself was not just the subject of these activities but directly and 
indirectly promoted non-governmental actions. Nevertheless, the mainstream grassroots 
activity concerning society-military relations stipulated by the rapid downsizing of the 
military was among the serious financial constraints.73 The reorganization of the military 
and almost the entire scope of civil-military relations was affected by the financial 
difficulties of the country, marked by a high level foreign debt, inflation, with the highest 
point being 28%, and 12% unemployment which in some regions was more than 20%.74 
The Hungarian Parliament decided to reduce radically the size of and to 
restructure the Armed Forces.75 Consequently, garrisons were closed, and in several 
cases this occurred in cities which were traditionally garrison-cities. In these places, the 
military-related civil organizations started to consider the difficulties facing ex-military 
communities and defense traditions. Although the MOD and the GS cooperated with 
these new organizations, the realization of the vacuum created in defense-related social 
interests and the possible role of these former military communities did not occur 
immediately.  
This serious gap remained long after the collapse of the communist type of 
homeland-defense-culture organizations, but currently severe social problems stimulated 
civil-military relations due to the necessity of human conversion. The high level of 
unemployment in connected state projects and the downsizing of the military opened new 
discussions between the military, the MOD and the civilian sector, including state 
organizations, local governments, non-governmental organizations, and universities 
dealing with the labor market. 
                                                 
72 NATO member states invited Hungary and the Czech Republic and Poland to accede to NATO on 8 
July 1997 at the NATO Summit. 
73 The defense budget declined from 2.8% of the GDP in 1989 to roughly 1.3% in 1997. Jeffry Simon, 
The New NATO Members: Will They Contribute? (http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/ forum160.html) 
NATO member states invited Hungary in 1997 at the NATO Summit Meeting in Madrid. Hungary has 
increased its defense budget by 0.1% per year since then.  
74 Katalin Bossanyi, “Economic Processes”, The Reliable Book of Facts: Hungary ’98 (Budapest: 
Greger-Delacroix, 1999) 134-142. 
75 88/1995 (VII. 6.) Parliamentary resolution about the long and midterm reorganization of Hungarian 
Defense Forces. Accordingly, the size of the military was reduced from 100,000 to 60,000 until the end 
1998, www.kerszov.hu/kzlcim. 
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Briefly, by the middle of the 1990s, the main consideration was not the 
establishment of institutions and legal frameworks, but maintaining procedures and 
reducing the military. Later on, starting in 1996-97, NATO enlargement and the 
consequences of the downsizing became more important. Furthermore, by the end of 
1997, the country was almost over the so-called shock therapy, so, slowly but surely, the 
available financial sources started to increase. Nevertheless, the process in civil society 
also shaped the characteristics of Hungarian civil-military relations. 
B. THE DEVELOPING CIVIL SOCIETY 
The early 1990s could be characterized by legalization, the conversion of 
civil/political society, and the awaking of the consciousness of the civil society. The 
middle of the decade was characterized by the extent and wide variety of civil 
organizations, the majority dominated by politicians, and civil-military relations 
dominated by military and ex-military personnel.  
By the mid 1990s, 19.5% of the Hungarian population were members76 of 
approximately 40,000 civil organizations.77 Although, a remarkable portion of society, it 
is difficult to estimate the share of the “real” civil society groups due to insufficient 
sources of data. As a matter of fact, the lax regulations concerning civil organizations and 
possible access to state financial resources inspired small groups of citizens to found non-
governmental organizations.78 Consequently, the number of civil organizations 
continuously increased during the 1990s and reached as many as 55,774 in 1997.  
What is worse is that accessing these financial resources required a good 
relationship with the political elite because a parliamentary committee decided, with 
accompanying heated debates and party rivalry, the allocation of financial assets.79 
Additionally, parliamentary subvention of civil organizations was crucial for the survival 
of these non-profit organizations. Although the parliament adopted a law80 under which 
                                                 
76 “Önszerveződő polgárok” (Self-organized citizens) Heti Világgazdaság (28 January 1995). 
77 Adrian Karatnycky, Alexander Motyl, and Charles Graybow, ed., Nation in Transit, 1998: Civil 
Society Democracy and Markets in East Central Europe and Newly Independent States (New Brunswick: 
Transaction Publishers, 1999) 278. 
78  Business and political groups often register as foundations to establish cover for the pursuit of 
private rather than public gain. Ibid. 278. 
79 “Társadalmi szervezetek támogatása” Heti Világgazdaság (28 January 1995). 
80 1996 / CXXVI. Law  (http://www.civil.info.hu/). 
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citizens could decide freely to give one percent of the income tax to qualified civil 
organizations81, it did not generate much independent funding.  
Local governments had limited sources and the private sector was not strong 
enough to significantly support such organizations. Nevertheless, some kind of 
cooperation emerged among these municipal, entrepreneurial and local NGO actors for 
supporting local interests such as providing services and strengthening cooperation 
between national decision-makers.  
Furthermore the state, as a result of civil society influence, realized the 
differentiation of civil organizations and that some of them could have been qualified to 
promote and/or carry out public duties considered important from the state point of view. 
This led to negotiations and finally resolving and passing the law on nonprofit 
organizations to create a category for NGOs whose activity promotes the “public 
interests” in 1997.82 Accordingly, what remained was the qualification of NGOs, which 
was a step towards financing worthy activities instead of virtual organizations. 
Due to these circumstances, military-related civil society developed and 
differentiated significantly, and part of it improved its capacity. Although society-state-
military relations improved, political parties controlled the vast number of civil 
organizations, while civil organizations controlled the military-related state bureaucracy. 
1. Protest Movements: Watchdogs 
Protest movements, the least dependent NGOs relying on subsidies from state 
institutions, could continue to act legally and had access to the media under the second, 
social-liberal government. HEL and ALBA Circle activities regularly appeared in the 
media and had connections to the MOD under the second government.83  In spite of their 
relatively small membership, they could communicate their values, and in some degree, 
                                                 
81 “Drága egy százalék” Magyar Hirlap (19 November 1996) 11. 
82 1997/CLVI law on public utilized organizations.  
83 Fehér József, State Secretary of the MOD, pointed to the importance of dialogue between the state 
and civil organizations, even though they had different beliefs, when he met with the representatives of the 
civil society at the MOD. Magyar Hirlap (17 May 1995) 27.  
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influence civil-military relations based on their well-developed international and 
domestic networks.84  
The common topic of these two organizations has been conscription. Between 
1994-1998, they publicly expressed several times the need to reduce compulsory military 
service.85 They have forced the government to make statements and the parliament to 
define this goal in related decisions. Although the government, as well as the parliament, 
had connections with these organizations, the decision was never made to eliminate 
conscription. However, the social-liberal government stated it as a long-term desired 
option. Furthermore, the Parliament’s decision about mid- and long-term transformation 
of the military, in 1995, contained the goal of increasing the ratio of volunteer, or 
contracted soldiers.86  
The activity of the protesters included active communication towards their main 
target group, the youth, concerning their legal rights in choosing alternative service. The 
ALBA Circle also organized a network for protecting civic rights connected to military 
service. The European Union’s PHARE program87 supported this project to enhance 
democratic consolidation in Hungary.88 This protective activity continuously pressed the 
state to follow the rules and make acceptable decisions.89  
                                                 
84 Hungarian military-related protest activist groups have produced exactly what is highlighted in M. 
E. Keck and K. Sikkink’s work concerning the accountability of politics: “Network activists, however, try 
to make such statements into opportunities for accountability politics. Once a government has publicly 
committed itself to a principle -…- networks can use those positions, and their command of information, to 
expose the distance between discourse and practice.” Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists 
Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998) 24. 
85 Exp.: HEL Press Conference, Magyar Hirlap (7 November 1994) 23. ALBA Circle expressed its 
opinion in the MOD, Magyar Hirlap (17 May 1995) 27.  
86 88/1995 (VII. 6.) Parliamentary resolution www.kerszov.hu/kzlcim. 
87 EU PHARE (Pologne et Hongrie: Actions pour la Reconversion Économique) program and SOROS 
Foundation, founded by George Soros, have been the most valuable, well organized sponsors of Hungarian 
civil society since the beginning of democratic transition.    
88 Magyar Hirlap (14 February 1995) 4.  
89 The ALBA Circle expressed its opinion concerning the use of manpower provided by the institution 
of alternative military service. Officials considered their opinion. Magyar Hirlap (19 March 1997) 5. The 
ALBA Circle also suggested introducing the institution of military ombudsman as a sufficient opportunity 
to protect soldier’s rights and protecting them against the abuse of power in the military, and “empowering 
civilian control over the military”, but thus far, this has not been the case. Magyar Hirlap (10 December 
1997) 
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The activists of the ALBA Circle regularly dealt with global issues also, such as 
war in Chechnya or the banning of landmines. The latter issue was especially interesting 
from the CMR point of view because it represented a situation in which a NGO drew 
attention to preparing an international regime and the necessary domestic answers. In this 
case, the NGO published the exact number of Hungarian landmines and called for their 
destruction and for official statements.90  
Other than the anti-conscription subject, the most well-known protest activity was 
when the ALBA Circle opposed NATO enlargement and Hungary’s NATO membership. 
Although this activity caused a “headache” for the government, it definitely pushed 
officials to publish more information, data, and make statements concerning the goals and 
results of possible NATO membership. For example the ALBA Circle, together with 
fourteen other civil organizations, required official statements against locating nuclear 
weapons on Hungarian territory in the case of NATO membership.91 These kinds of 
activity, as a part of DCMR, ensured control not just of the military but of the military-
related state-bureaucracy and its accountability as well. It also pressed the Parliament and 
the ministries (MOD, MFA) to take under consideration the articulated different opinions 
and increasing state-society communication concerning the military.     
2. Slowly Emerging Defense-Culture Organizations: Troubleshooting  
This aspect of society-military relations was not able to recover after communism 
during the mid 1990s. National defense–related traditions were rarely considered by 
grassroots organizations. Particular small groups92 and local activists considered national 
defense and military traditions, and organized an increasing variety of events,93 but 
nationwide activity was not manifested. Schools did not have defense-culture-related 
activities, only certain national days were celebrated concerning defense traditions. At the 
same time, the military itself went through a difficult, under-financed transformation, 
which caused a decline in public affairs and cultural programs even in the military in the 
middle of the 1990s. 
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92 “Vitezi Rend (Order of Valiant Warriors), Foundation for Arpad-house Knights’ Military Traditions 
etc. 
93 Many of the local organization events considered tourism with medieval games. 
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As previously mentioned, military reorganization and downsizing led to the 
establishment of defense-cultural associations. Local ex-military communities primarily 
run these civil organizations as happened in the two cases in Janoshalma and Jaszbereny 
(p. 29). These organizations in former garrison-cities followed the pattern of the founders 
and started organizing the ex-military communities and building relationships with local 
authorities, schools, and cultural facilities as well as looking for MOD and GS 
connections. Nevertheless, their first steps naturally focused on financial difficulties and 
organizing basic programs for retired and demobilized military personnel. 
Most of the volunteer management of these organizations learned relatively 
quickly non-profit managing techniques and produced remarkable results.94 Furthermore, 
these organizations continuously pressed state officials, both in formal and informal 
ways, to support their activities. Their integrating, coordinating activities undoubtedly 
were of vital importance to the local and national authorities due to the potential social 
tensions that could be caused by a relatively large number of unintegrated, disadvantaged, 
and occasionally unemployed ex-military personnel. Furthermore, the MOD was driven 
to help them by moral motives. Consequently, these organizations could obtain a barter 
agreement with the MOD.95 
As a result of the agreement they could rent MOD-owned property for services. 
These services mainly contained cultural programs for ex-military communities, but 
additional elements targeted the local civilian community. Cooperation with local 
libraries, museums and elementary schools appeared with programs considering military 
traditions. Nevertheless, this cooperation was a minor part of their activities. The 
obviously vital problem remained of the integration of the former military community, 
which was separated earlier from the civilian part of the cities and developed a kind of 
subculture difficult to penetrate.  
The transitory situation between these self-organized communities and the MOD 
changed essentially in 1997, when the MOD worked out a new policy concerning 
                                                 
94 Maj. Ferenc Molnár, “Atmenet, avagy az ex-katona-társadalom ‘C’ variánsa” (Home-defense-
culture organizations in former garrison-cities) Human Szemle (Hungarian military periodical) 1999. 3. 
95 Interview with Ret. LTC Jozsef Mucsi advisor of the Social and Cultural Affairs Department of the 
MOD. (11 May, 2002). 
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military cultural facilities.96 According to this document, the MOD categorized the 
cultural organizations and defined a category for these NGOs, namely “C”-type 
organizations. The MOD decision declared that these nonprofit NGOs, foundations and 
associations, were the primary elements in cities and regions to care about cultural 
programs for ex-military personnel, their families, and military traditions in the civilian 
sector. At the same time, these organizations could expect subsidies if they were 
successfully applied yearly.  
Common steps of the newly emerged national-defense-culture-related NGOs and 
the MOD were a potential source of building better and stronger society-military 
relations. However, these NGOs were established in only a handful of places and did not 
extend to the entire country, and the success of their activities varied. 
Deficiencies in social-military relations remained a problem. It seemed that this 
aspect of CMR would develop very slowly in spite of the NGOs’ activity. Without active 
state participation, this part of CMR could hardly develop and support social integration 
of the military. Nevertheless, the ex-military communities’ NGOs and other small, local 
civil initiatives tended to show a rather colorful picture even though not very successful. 
3. Think-Tank and Educator Organizations  
The middle of the 1990s brought the formulation of new NGOs dealing with 
military and security-related questions into, or close to, academic circles. The process of 
establishing new organizations increased due to the anticipated NATO enlargement. 
However, active and retired military people dominated these organizations, and civilian 
experts slowly appeared in small numbers. Furthermore, the established organizations 
carried out popularization activities concerning a reorganized military and NATO 
enlargement rather than fulfilling an analyzer and/or advisory role. 
The CSDSF remained the leading organization and its activity improved due to 
mutual cooperation with the current social-liberal government. Consequently, the MOD 
and MFA ordered several expert analyses and organizer tasks from and via this NGO. At 
the same time, the activity of the CSDSF improved in other ways because their efforts in 
building relations with universities and newly emerging NGOs were successful. 
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Additionally, the CSDSF proved, even in small numbers, and occasionally, that such an 
institution could be a useful supporter of emerging civilian experts as a work or training 
place for civilians.97 However, the dominance of active or former military personnel 
continued in this organization. 
The policy, and probably the opportunities, of the CSDSF remained the same as 
in the beginning, such as organizing events and coordinating contracted (for single task) 
academics rather than employing experts. Presumably, financial considerations supported 
this solution from the organizational side and the reality in Hungary supported it as well. 
Being more exact, the few Hungarian military defense experts have not wanted to risk 
being employed by an NGO. National NGOs have been judged fairly as unstable, under-
financed institutions and remarkably dependent on the current governing political parties.  
Newly emerging non-profit organizations in this field also were established and 
run by former military people and/or politicians. Two NGOs were established in the 
middle of the 1990s: the Manfred Wörner Foundation (MWF) and the Military-Science 
and Security Policy Association (HABE). The latter was established inside the Scientific 
Information Association (TIT), which was a well-known national NGO. Both seemed to 
be educator and policy-promoter organizations and not think tanks.  
Politicians, from the governing and opposition sides as well, and military leaders 
established the MWF in 1995 for disseminating information on NATO and democratic 
control over the armed forces, and for educating civilians on security policies. They also 
intended to create forums discussing the Euro-Atlantic integration of Hungary.98  
In the beginning, the MWF primarily organized events to make NATO and the 
military more popular, which made it well known. These successful activities were 
presumably consequences of the founder’s good political connections and the leading 
issue of NATO enlargement. Nevertheless, the officially well financed events created a 
delicate situation when an NGO action was demonstratively opposed by another NGO.  
                                                 
97 Some civilian experts were employed for a while and civilian university students spent their training 
time at CSDSF. Interview with Péter Deák (12 March 2002). 
98 Magyar Hirlap (10 May 1996) 2. 
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This happened when the MWF launched its program, the so-called NATO-train, 
as a mobile advocate of NATO and Hungarian NATO membership with politicians, 
experts, industrial representatives, and journalists on board. Three activists of the ALBA 
Circle tied themselves to trains in protest.99  
Although the foundation organized a few more successful events sponsored by the 
state, its activity has slowly but surely moved towards a mainly educator role since 
1997.100 The slow adjustment in the foundation profile changed the organization from a 
state-policy communicator organization to an educator NGO focusing on security issues. 
In accordance with this transformation, more experts than politicians appeared in their 
programs and the budget received decreased funding.101 Nevertheless, the situation was 
similar in the case of the CSDSF, but in this case, the consumers, the targeted audience, 
were not primarily political and military decision-makers but civilians. 
Retired military personnel, mainly from military schools, established the other 
emerging NGO, the HABE in 1996. They declared their goals to be the preparation of 
independent security-related analyses and education of youth and teachers for Euro-
Atlantic integration, foreign and security policy, as well as armed organization-related 
topics.102  
This organization, enjoying the great prestige of TIT, developed its activities quite 
quickly and well. It has established regular programs and publications. It has a permanent 
lecture series on current security policy issues, summer university programs on 
modernization, integration and security issues, and conferences on regional security in 
different Hungarian regions. In accordance, the educator role of HABE integrated with 
the pubic education system to offer security-related special programs.103 The HABE, as a 
result of its cooperation agreement with national organizations, also organized meetings 
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between civil organizations and leaders of national armed organizations such as the 
military, police and border guards.  
Although this NGO made remarkable efforts in disseminating information about 
security-related topics, including military issues, its activity rarely included academic 
analysis or adviser roles. Furthermore, generally active or retired officers contributed to 
its activity. Consequently, it could encourage civilians dealing with security and military, 
but could not itself perform think tank roles since it lacked independent highly qualified 
experts and/or orders from potential consumers such as members of Parliament, 
parliamentary committees, MFA or MOD. 
Briefly, the middle of the 1990s was the time for establishing new NGOs in the 
academic field. These NGOs were dominated by military personnel and/or politicians 
whose goal was to support Hungarian integration in NATO and encourage civilians to 
deal with security-related topics. In other words, since alternative approaches to 
security104 and the military did not support the potential consumers, instead of officially 
existing approaches, new methods were found to convey opinions to the general public. 
Only the CSDSF fulfilled advisory roles with politicians, partly using its own and partly 
the knowledge of contracted experts. 
To summarize, the horizontal aspect of CMR developed in the middle of the 
1990s during the second freely elected government. There were not just simply more 
actors but their networks became richer in some degree, and their activity more diverse. 
As the military–related civil society developed, differentiation became increasingly 
obvious. The protestors remained independent from the state and political parties and 
could utilize the activities of volunteers and international advocacy networks. They 
influenced the state to make clear statements on certain issues. Other sections of the civil 
organizations strongly depend on the state. These organizations fulfilled partly integrator 
roles, avoiding social tensions in the ex-military communities, and partly advocator and 
educator roles on defense- and military-related matters. Nevertheless, the social-military 
                                                 
104 Important to note is that highly qualified experts dealt with particular security-related topics at 
universities, at the Hungarian Academy of Science, and most regularly at the Hungarian Institution of 
Foreign Affairs. Strictly military and other armed organizations’ issues was mainly not their concern. 
Highly qualified military experts, such as military personnel, depended principally on their superiors, so 
alternative opinions could be published at risk.  
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gap was not eliminated and seemed likely to remain for a long time. Think tank activities 
and alternative evaluations of military issues did not, or at least, rarely occurred. 
Consequently, civilian society control over the military, and especially defense-related 
bureaucracy, was miniscule.  
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V. STATE DOMINANCE AND WEAKENING CIVIL 
INFLUENCE, 1998-2002 
The dominant political and military theme in Hungary for 1998 was the 
preparation for NATO enlargement. The consolidation of democratic CMR continued 
and reasonable hopes emerged on account of the foreseeable membership in NATO, the 
country’s improving economic performance, and the increasing defense budget. Although 
the civil involvement in military-related discussions was increasing due to NATO-related 
public and academic discussions as well as the activities of national civilian institutions 
and local groups concerning military conversion, by the middle of the new governing 
cycle military personnel strongly dominated the MOD. 
This chapter argues that while the number of non-governmental organizations 
further increased, the vast majority of them remained weak. The state tightened the 
relationship with the civil society and the political parties and increasingly the governing 
parties ruled civil society. Although the MOD policy reflected the role of NGOs during 
the introduction of military reform, the communication of the MOD with military-related 
NGOs became selective and typically one-way, from the ministry to the NGOs. The 
MOD became reluctant to communicate with NGOs, which represented different values 
and alternate opinions compared to the government. 
A. LEADING CMR ISSUES 
The continuity of the process in CMR did not seem to be interrupted even with 
the surprising results of the parliamentary elections when the social-liberal coalition lost 
the election. The former opposition parties FIDESZ-Hungarian Civic Party (FIDESZ-
MPP) and FKGP (Independent Small Holders Party) formulated a new right-of-center 
governing coalition. FIDESZ dominated the coalition but, as a result of the coalition 
agreement, the FKGP nominated the Minister of Defense. 
There was no doubt that the lack of defense-related expertise in the FKGP, when 
the country was preparing to join NATO, could result in problems. Consequently, the 
new political leadership in the MOD did not change the most important personnel dealing 
with the defense policy, headed by Istvan Gyarmati. Non-Small Holder Party expert 
civilians, such as the former FIDESZ politician Tamas Waschler, became the 
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administrative state secretary in the ministry. All together, five out of the seven top 
leaders of the MOD were civilians and expertise was strengthened under the FKGP 
political leadership. 
The new government was basically concerned with the same set of important 
CMR issues as its predecessor. These were NATO enlargement-related modifications to 
the Hungarian CMR105, the integration of the MOD and the GS, and reforming the 
military. The intention was to have a smaller but more capable organization. NATO 
encouraged Hungary to solve quickly and effectively all related problems. Although 
political parties agreed that these were all important issues, the domestic political 
dynamics and the still existing financial constraints did not support rapid solutions.  
Hungarian political life started to become so complex that for a time even NATO 
was not able to press the parties involved to cooperate.106 The modification to the 
constitution concerning the right of parliament vs. government using and deploying 
forces became exclusively a domestic political matter and was not considered to be a 
CMR problem.  
The integration of the MOD and the GS, another relevant issue, was much more 
an actual civil-military debate. Nevertheless, it was not isolated from political rivalry. 
The center of this dispute was the place and role of the chief of the GS and the 
administrative secretary. The possible concepts with extensive academic involvement 
were worked out under the previous government but the new government had to make a 
decision about it. This decision making resulted in a severe conflict between the 
administrative state secretary and the chief of staff. During the first round, the chief of 
staff, General Ferenc Vegh, was replaced.107 The administrative state secretary, Tamas 
Wachsler, hoped that an easier solution would be reached with the new chief of staff, but 
this did not happen. After long standing debates, the new chief of staff, General Lajos 
                                                 
105 NATO strongly supported an amendment to the constitution extending the right to the executive 
power to use and deploy forces. At the same time, the relationship was deteriorating between the governing 
coalition and the opposition because the governing parties continuously acted much more harshly against 
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106 “Ellenzéki indokok NATO-követeknek” Magyar Hirlap (3 December 1998) 3. 
107 “Magyarország NATO-tag” Heti Vilaggazdasag (25 December 1999). 
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Fodor, successfully built a political coalition108 and was supported by the GS. 
Consequently the administrative state secretary had no other choice but to resign.109  
Technically, the integration was finally resolved in the fall of 2001.110 At last 
there was an opportunity to diminish the parallel working functions in the formerly 
separated GS and MOD and reduce the organizations. Opportunities also existed to 
improve transparency of the military for civilian leaders in the MOD and also for 
politicians. However, it required civilian experts also, since when the integration 
technically occurred, former military people were again in top positions in the MOD, 
except for the minister, the political state secretary, and the chief of the ministerial 
cabinet. None of them had previous military-related experience. 
The lack of civilian experts has continued to be the hallmark of the Hungarian 
CMR even after a decade of transitioning. Basically, there are few civilians who 
understand military-related issues, and personnel change quite frequently. New people 
come for a short time; and experienced people leave the MOD mainly for political 
reasons when newly elected governments take office.111 People leave also because of 
salary problems in the lower positions. Nevertheless, the situation was better ten years 
after the regime changed.  
First, some civilians have continued to deal with security-related issues mainly in 
the parliamentary parties. In spite of the changes in the political parties in power, they 
have learned much and have become experts.112 Second, senior military personnel who 
can give advice to the civilian leaders are much more trusted now. However, this 
cooperation has resulted in coalition building which has not always been functional in the 
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formation of a capable military. A. A. Bebler described this feature of post-communist 
countries in transition: 
In the officer ranks the closeness to or known sympathies for a certain 
political party have (again) become an important or even the principal 
criterion for promotion or sacking – at the expense of the personal 
competence, professional knowledge, skills and achievements.113  
However, what Bebler wrote was not strictly true in Hungary. The political 
orientation, or to be more correct, the loyalty to a certain political party has been 
considered a source of trustworthiness during the permanent reorganization of the 
military, which has involved significant transfers of property from the military to state-
owned and private companies since the beginning of the transformation. 
At the same time, there have been functional sides of this coalition building in 
relation to the competition for state and international resources. This competition required 
the military and civilian authorities to fully cooperate with each other on the one hand, 
and on the other hand, it was important because of the typical weak position of the MOD.  
Ultimately, the greatest civil-military debates about civil society involvement 
occurred around the time of the newest military reform. Military reform was unavoidable 
after Hungarian capabilities were seriously criticized114 and after the Kosovo crisis which 
demonstrated the weakness of the Hungarian military. This weakness was embodied by 
amortized and/or non-NATO compatible technical assets and non-properly trained 
personnel as a consequence of the permanently under-financed organization.115 The 
government ordered a strategic review of the military, and as a result, the MOD 
developed an ambitious reform plan. The MOD considered a reform lasting ten years, 
which touched upon virtually all segments of the military including structure, size, 
dislocation of units, characteristics of the forces, leadership, human policy institutions, 
life and working conditions, training, and technical modernization.116 Obviously, such a 
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reform should have resulted in many connections with the civil sector and with civil 
society organizations as well.  
50 
B. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
By the end of the 1990s, the legal framework of civil organizations was 
completed. It reflected the differences in civil society as a result of negotiations between 
the representatives of civil society and the state. It meant legal differentiation between 
“common” civil organizations and of those who carried out public duties. This legally 
formulated solution,117 delegating state responsibilities to NGOs, and the fact that 
politicians and state institutions established many NGOs, furthermore the entire situation, 
in which most of the civil organizations (at least financially) depended on the state (more 
exactly on the political parties in the parliament) softened the boundary between civil 
society and the state.  
It has also resulted in permanent negotiations and cooperation between the state 
and an important part of civil organizations in setting an agenda to evaluate the efficiency 
of activities. At the same time, it also resulted in an assertive government being able to 
ban and/or discriminate against organizations,118 which were potentially able to articulate 
an opinion that did not support the official ideas. However, strong NGOs, such as the 
Soros Foundation, external supporters such as NATO, the EU, INGOs, and potentially 
the successfully developing private economy sector, could significantly influence civil 
society by offering education, training, opportunities for communication and financial 
support.  
Ultimately, the general trend remained the same as in the middle of the 1990s, so 
the number of NGOs further increased in Hungary. According to official statistics, as 
many as 61,907 non-governmental organizations were registered in 1999. This number 
included fully or partly self-organized groups as well. Nevertheless, only approximately 
one third are continuously active and the annual budget of only 5,000 NGOs exceeds 
18,000 USD. Furthermore, interestingly enough, one third of the foundations and a 
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quarter of the associations were in Budapest in 1999 and two thirds of the total non-
governmental budget accumulated was also in Budapest. The weak boundary between the 
state and the civil sector also caused difficulties in estimating the real power of civil 
society. Some of the public NGOs could act as background organizations of ministries. 
These organizations represented 2% of the NGOs and they owned 25% of the overall 
Hungarian NGO-budget.119 
Naturally, the military-related civil society showed similar features to those 
generally described. If any changes occurred when compared to the middle of the 1990s, 
it was with the cooperation that the military extended to the civilian sector as a result of 
military reform and NATO encouragement. At the same time, the relationship of the state 
and so the MOD with civil organizations, became more and more coordinated.120 The 
willingness of the MOD to collaborate, however, has been quite selective. Those 
organizations that promoted state initiatives have benefited significantly compared to 
those which did not. It resulted in a kind of clientism, which has not improved the 
transparency and accountability of the military and state authorities. Organizations 
performing these functions have needed alternative financial resources. 
1. Protest Organizations 
Protest organizations do not rely on state support, but proper communication with 
the state has been necessary for them to negotiate certain issues important to them. It 
could be important for the MOD as well as for these social groups. It would have been 
especially useful concerning the topic, namely compulsory military service vs. all 
voluntary force, which has enjoyed wider acceptance in society. 
In this respect, the relationship between the protestors and the MOD worsened 
between 1998-2002. Although the protestors found a way to express their beliefs, they 
were more able to press the opposition parties to formulate and express their opinions 
than to influence the government’s standpoint. 
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This was a result, on the one hand, of the government’s, and especially the 
FKGP’s, strong emotional adherence to compulsory military service as a traditional form 
of home defense. On the other hand, it was the outcome of a public debate between an 
active military officer, Major Mihaly Szucs, and the state secretary of the MOD, Istvan 
Gyarmati.121 As a matter of fact, the debate which considered the status of the military 
officer and the secretary in the hierarchy, was a strange incident. The officer had been a 
member of the HEL because he believed that modernization of the armed forces, 
including its higher social prestige, required diminishing the compulsory military 
service.122 Nonetheless, the outcome of this scandal was that the MOD tried to find a way 
to punish the major, and for a while was able to, but the HEL, a protest movement, 
monitored and enforced the rule of law and finally he was able to remain in the service 
and maintain his unique status in the HEL. This case proved, even in an extraordinary 
way, the power of the rule of law and the power of a civil organization and publicity in 
Hungary. 
Nevertheless, protest organizations, and other organizations sharing this opinion 
concerning conscription, were not able to influence the governing coalition’s idea about 
compulsory military service. Representatives of the HEL became persona non grata in the 
MOD and the organization was not invited to debates on conscription.123 Additionally, 
the government started steadily arguing for conscription using emotional, rather than 
rational arguments,124 and developed a long-term plan to preserve compulsory military 
service.125 The HEL evaluated this situation as a step backwards when compared to the 
previous government, which at least, as a middle or long-term project, accepted the 
concept of an all voluntary force. 
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The HEL started to act aggressively by using the media and the forthcoming 
parliamentary elections. This NGO did not just keep the conscription issue on the agenda 
but from time to time forced political parties to declare their clear opinions about the 
question of compulsory military service. They organized events with the participation of 
representatives of political parties and experts, and utilized every media event and 
internet forums126 for clarifying the different positions concerning military service. They 
also advertised poll results, which indicated that a very significant portion of the 
population favored an all voluntary force. Opposition political parties started to use the 
same arguments for an all voluntary force against the governing coalition as a result of 
HEL’s influence.127 
Finally, all political parties clearly stated their position on the question of 
conscription and all non-ruling parties, except the far right MIEP, argued for the 
introduction of an all voluntary force during the next governing cycle (2002-2006).128 
The parliamentary elections resulted in a social-liberal governing coalition in April 2002, 
which committed itself to eliminating compulsory military service.129 
Besides the HEL, the ALBA Circle also emphasized the need for an all voluntary 
force, but its activity continued to help young men avoid armed service and represented a 
wider anti-violence, anti-military activity.130 The activity of the ALBA Circle influenced 
the CMR insomuch as it socialized the military, and other officials, for properly handling 
the fact that citizens could express their alternate opinions in a democracy. This occurred 
when the ALBA Circle activists protested against violence and war in 2001.131 
Nevertheless, it was rather a scandal when the ALBA activists placed the “Lethal Star” 
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sign next to the NATO logo in the middle of the Hungarian capital during the NATO 
Foreign Minister’s meeting in Budapest on 28-30 May 2001.132  
2. Defense-Culture-Related Organizations: Changing Policy 
Defense-culture-related NGOs significantly relied on state support during the 
1990s. However, they were much more independent than the vast majority of different 
cultural organizations of the MOD and the GS.133 Although these NGOs were quite 
fragile, they were mainly able to integrate defense-culture-related activities into local 
society and carried out their missions and gained the support of the state, local 
governments, NGOs, and entrepreneurs.  
Their negotiations with the MOD and GS were relatively successful during the 
1990s and influenced the CMR transformation in a manner similar to how the entire civil 
society-state relationship was formed. Nevertheless, the very end of that decade also 
brought about a special solution for state- owned (MOD-GS) military-related cultural 
organizations. These cultural organizations have had to be more independent in adapting 
their working mechanism to the “cultural market” just as did their tiny NGO 
counterparts.134 The idea came with the latest military reform (reform 2000-2010) and 
was intended to serve two goals at the same time: reduce the expenses of the MOD and 
increase the effectiveness of the cultural organizations.  
In this transformation, the MOD established three associations. One was the 
“MOD Cultural Service Association” in 2000.135 The Associations have been nonprofit 
organizations implementing the public duties instead of the state. These organizations 
received those properties (buildings, infrastructures, equipment, etc.) which served as 
cultural interests and had belonged to the MOD. The activities of the Associations are 
regulated by law136 just as are similar organizations, but not necessarily state-established 
non-profit organizations. Nevertheless, the state (MOD) had to take responsibility for 
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financing these institutions during their first two years. Later, the Associations have to be 
able to work effectively with market circumstances.  
The duties of the MOD Cultural Service Association have covered cultural and 
welfare activities, which have had to provide services to military personnel and to the 
civilian population as well in 31 cities. The Association has had to cooperate with other 
state (ministries), churches, local (local governments137, schools, museums) and NGO 
(patriot associations, club) organizations.138 The MOD has financed the previously self-
organized groups, as well as being able to support self-organized home-defense-related 
cultural initiatives via this new Association.139  
Although the MOD was influenced by the earliest self-organized NGOs to find a 
solution to support maintaining the home-defense-culture, it also acted under the serious 
financial constraints. The ministerial decision concerning cultural institutions probably 
will improve the social-military relations via associations, but it is still a question whether 
in the future these associations could serve a parallel function building society-military 
relations and strengthening military cohesion, or has it been only a short-term solution for 
the MOD. 
3. Think Tanks and Educators  
The development of the rather academic dimension of the horizontal aspects of 
CMR continued after 1998. At the same time, this development was controversial. New 
NGOs were established, which focused on, just as did the earlier established ones, 
education and conference organization. The research activities remained in government-
controlled institutions, in which loyalty was strongly recommended, or occasionally, in 
the hands of some individual scientists at universities. Furthermore, strictly military-
related research activity remained inside the military or former military personnel dealt 
with it in the CSDSF and the HABE. Consequently, the NGOs’ educator and 
                                                 
137 Important to note is that local governments increasingly depend on the national government 
because the proportion of the personal income taxes they could control declined remarkably. It was 50% in 
1992, 30% in 1995, 15% in 1999 and then it was reduced to 5% in 2000. Adrian Karatnycky, Alexander 
Motyl, and Charles Graybow, ed., Nation in Transit (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2001) 202.  
138 Interview with Ret. LTC Jozsef Mucsi, advisor to the Social and Cultural Affairs Department of 
the MOD. (11 May 2002). 
139 The Association advertised financial opportunities for NGOs serving home-defense cultural goals. 
www.honvedelem.hu/cikk.php?cikk=8429. 
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communicator activity (mainly on behalf of state policy) influenced the CMR, rather than 
their alternative approaches. Therefore, the analysis of the military-related topics and the 
number of expert civilians, who understand military, continued to increase only slowly. 
The earlier established think tank and educator NGOs continued their activity 
among similar circumstances during the early years of the new government. The CSDSF, 
for instance, developed a version of a national strategic defense concept requisitioned by 
the MOD.140 Similarly, the Manfred Wörner Foundation, which became a dominantly 
educator NGO regarding NATO and EU-related issues, was very active in defense-
related education, and most remarkably in cooperation with the association of history 
teachers.141 
Although these NGOs have been acting continuously, military-related research 
was conducted by the military and retired military personnel at government controlled 
institutions, mainly at the Zrinyi Miklos National Defense University and the Institute for 
Strategic and Defense Studies, just as before. Furthermore, the situation of the NGOs 
became more difficult after 2000. It was largely caused by the dependence of NGOs on 
state support. After the millennium, the impact of the government on NGOs became more 
significant than previously.142 The government, and especially the MOD, cut sources and 
repressed alternative opinions while requiring absolute loyalty. For example, the MOD 
organized a conference on a new version of compulsory military service and not a single 
organization or expert invited who might argue against it.143 Furthermore, high-ranking 
officials occasionally and informally claimed the loyalty of researchers or even negative 
sanctions against their freedom. Nevertheless, non-state sources worked144 to some 
degree and naturally, the parliamentary opposition also encouraged alternative opinions.  
                                                 
140 Interview with Péter Deák (12 March 2002). 
141 Interview with Ferenc Horovitz, Executive Manager of MWF. (16 May 2002). 
142 It was recognized not exclusively in the case of defense-related NGOs, but generally. “Pártpolitika 
a civil szektorban: Azok boldogulnak, akik patrónust találnak maguknak” Népszabadság (21 March 2002). 
143 Conference: Honvédelem és Nemzetőrség (31 May 2000). 
144 For instance, the Soros Foundation supported the CSDSF and also the international program 
concerning conscription-related corruption (organized by Open Society Foundation in 2000).  
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Although the situation of the aforementioned NGOs worsened, they continued 
their activities. Also, the cooperation of the new NGOs and the civil-military ties between 
the military and civilian universities improved.  
As far as the new NGOs are concerned, an important initiative was born in 
Szeged, a city in southern Hungary. The Szeged Center for Security Policy (SCSP) is a 
joint project of the Municipal Government of the city of Szeged, the Hungarian Academy 
of Sciences and the University of Szeged.145 The founders of the SCSP realized the 
importance of security-related, including military, matters after two wars in the 1990s 
that occurred very close to Szeged and after NATO enlargement and the preparations for 
EU membership. The SCSP as a public NGO could gain state, and also significant local 
and academic, support from the founders.  
The programs of the SCSP have offered security-related conferences, even on 
sensitive topics, such as conscription, where the institution could preserve its neutrality 
and the prestigious founders could guarantee the freedom of speech.146 This NGO also 
has had educator tasks concerning security and military issues, in cooperation with the 
University of Szeged, the CSDSF147, as well as with state-controlled institutions. It 
appears to be reliable and effective in light of the information provided by their website. 
Although the SCSP has not been involved with strictly military-related research activity, 
its active organizer and educator activity definitely involved civilians on military-related 
issues. 
Another NGO has emerged recently with the goal to encourage Hungarian 
security-related academic life and academic-political dialogue. The Centre for 
Euroatlantic Integration and Democracy (CEID), which has started to act as a regional 
institute for Central Europe and the Balkans, is seemingly focusing on global and 
regional security problems and brings together politicians, military personnel, and 
                                                 
145 http://www.scsp.hu/eng/index.html. 
146 http://www.scsp.hu/eng/index.html. 
147 In the second semester of the 2000/2001 academic year, the SCSP, in cooperation with the CSDSF, 
launched a security policy course at the University of Szeged. http://www.scsp.hu/eng/index.html. 
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academics supported by Western institutions.148 Although the CEID has not conducted 
independent research or educator duties, it could create a certain culture of open dialogue 
concerning security, including military-related issues, as a contribution to the further 
consolidation of Hungarian democratic civil–military relations. 
Besides these NGOs, some academics have been dealing with security-related 
questions in Hungarian universities.149 Their activities are definitely supported by NATO 
and their outputs generally have appeared in international forums as well. Nevertheless, 
their activities are rather individual and rarely touch upon strictly military issues. 
Consequently, their influence on the CMR has been confined and has not affected such 
issues as transparency of the military, the “governmentalization” of the conscription 
issue, or the integration of the MOD and GS. 
Nevertheless, the relationship between the military and civilian universities 
improved. The MOD completed a cooperation contract with the Budapest University of 
Technology and Economics in November 2001150 and the University of Pecs in May 
2002.151 It promoted the relationship between the society and the military. The contracts 
concern the further education of military officers in different fields, which were 
undoubtedly important. Nevertheless, the problem of a lack of civilian research projects, 
improving the transparency of the military and increasing the number of civilian experts 
remained.  
Briefly, disseminating information about the new security agenda and the military 
in the society has remained more typical than providing free, alternative non-
governmental opinions under the third freely elected government. Furthermore, the 
assertive, one way communication of the MOD, and to some degree, the entire 
government, made it difficult for the think tank and educator NGOs to influence the 
                                                 
148 The first remarkable event organized by the CEID was a conference “New Security Policy System 
in Europe” (18-19 March 2002). Telephone interview with Sebestyén Gorka, Director of the CEID (15 May 
2002). 
149 Exp.: László Valki (Professor of International Law), ELTE University, Zsolt Rostoványi 
(Professor of International Relations) Budapest University of Economics and Public Administration. 
150 Együttműködési szerződés a Műegyetemmel www.honvédelem.hu/cikk.php_cikk=6920. 
151 MTI (2 May 2002) www.mti.hu. 
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CMR. Nevertheless, the potential source of future civilian experts increased as a result of 
the appearance of related topics in more and more areas.   
In summary, the number of horizontal actors in CMR increased in Hungary 
between 1998-2002. To be more exact, the number of cultural and educational NGOs 
increased, while the think tank and protestor organizations remained at the same level. 
What is probably more important is that the actual influence of the military-related civil 
society on the CMR improved only in a particular sense. NGOs communicated military-
related matters such as NATO membership, security policy, military reform, and home-
defense traditions more intensively, and the connection between civilian universities and 
the military improved. Nevertheless, the open dialogue between the military-related civil 
society and state officials did not improve, or rather declined, under the third government, 
while government influence on non-government actors increased. This influence was 
restrictive in the case of protestors and selected, earlier prosperous think tank and 
educator NGOs, while this influence was encouraging in the case of home-defense 









THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
61 
VI. CONCLUSION 
To summarize, the consolidation of democratic civil-military relations calls for 
enhancing the horizontal actors of CMR as a normatively integral part of a democratic 
system. The development of the horizontal aspect of CMR can improve the democratic 
quality of civil-military relations and could benefit the state defense policy and thus the 
military as well. This thesis identified five types of military-related NGOs (INGO, union-
like, research and educator, cultural, and protest organizations) and the media as 
horizontal actors in CMR. This aspect of CMR has received less attention so far, but 
without active civil society participation inherent problems of CMR of transitional 
democracies, such as a low level of transparency, lack of civilians, and the society-
military gap cannot be solved.  
Horizontal actors have to be highlighted because development of the civil society, 
especially a part of it, which geared towards the military, just slowly emerging in post-
communist countries. In these countries, civic tradition is not as strong as generally in 
matured democracies and civil societies primarily deal with social-economic difficulties 
and just slightly focus on military- and/or defense-related matters. Enhancing the 
military-related civil society in Central and Eastern Europe is especially difficult after the 
Cold War because the public attitude generally has been skeptical or apathetic toward the 
military and the military participation ratio has been declining. It has been the case in 
Hungary, where additionally, as an output of the former authoritarian regime, the military 
was alienated from the society. 
The Hungarian democratic civil-military relations have developed significantly in 
the last twelve years. The CMR-related structures and procedures underwent a 
remarkable learning process during three governing cycles. Nevertheless, the civil society 
component of the Hungarian CMR received less attention from experts and (according to 
the description of three types of the NGOs) its development was slow and controversial. 
The development of the horizontal aspect of CMR has been slow in accordance 
with the general rule of the democratic transition, in which the political and legal 
transformation is the most rapid, the economic changes need more time, and social 
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changes require probably new generations.152 The polemic nature of the development of 
the horizontal actors in the Hungarian CMR is linked to the strong dependence on state 
financial resources. The result is that most of the military-related NGOs serve the military 
and the state and hardly control it. The relevance of the problem is higher considering the 
lack of civilians in these NGOs. Nonetheless, the development of the military-related 
civil society can be more rapid as a consequence of the country’s economic improvement 
and the Euro-Atlantic integration.  
The civil society was involved in creating the foundations of democratic civil-
military relations as a part of the new, democratic political system at the beginning of the 
transition. Nevertheless, there were not many civil organizations geared towards the 
military in the early 1990s. However, the legal foundation of establishing NGOs was set 
up at that time. Later on, the number of the non-governmental organizations continuously 
has increased but strongly depended on the state subvention. This development was 
slightly reduced by the law153 in 1996, which gave the opportunity to citizens deciding 
freely to give one percent of the income tax to NGOs. The military-related civil society 
differentiated legally and in practices during the last five years. The legal differentiation 
occurred in 1997 when the parliament adopted a law,154 which created a category for 
NGOs whose activity promotes the “public interests.” This development promoted those 
organizations that communicate state-accepted information about the military and 
defense policy. The obvious practical differentiation happened during the latest military 
reform in 2000, which placed cultural organizations out of the MOD-GS and organized 
them as NGOs. 
Although the state influence on military-related civil society was significant, the 
horizontal actors (protestors, cultural, and research and/or educational organizations) 
have also affected the Hungarian CMR: 
Protest organizations, which illegally existed during late communism, could 
continue their work legally and publicly. They spread out their beliefs and information 
                                                 
152 Attila Ágh, Emerging Democracies in East Central Europe and the Balkans, (Northampton: 
Edward Elgar, 1998) 11. 
153 1996 / CXXVI. Law  (http://www.civil.info.hu/). 
154 1997/CLVI Law. 
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about the military and defense. They influenced conscription-related debates and 
continuously monitored the military and defense bureaucracy and socialized it to be 
under civilian control. They also influenced the state to make clear statements on certain 
issues utilizing the activities of volunteers and international advocacy networks. The 
protestors remained independent from the state and political parties. Nevertheless, they 
had some difficulties in communicating with governments, especially under the third 
government because of the lack of willingness on the state side.  
Cultural, researcher and educator NGOs have strongly depend on the state. 
Cultural organizations fulfilled partly integrator roles, minimizing social tensions due to 
the growth of ex-military communities, and also promoted defense- and military-related 
matters. Although these organizations developed the social-military relations in some 
degree the elimination of the social-military gap seems to remain a long-term task. 
Furthermore, the changed structure of cultural NGOs (after the MOD created relatively 
large cultural NGOs in 2000) resulted a situation, which mixed two roles in the ministry-
made NGOs: integrating the military to the society and improving the cohesion of the 
military. The effectiveness of this decision is not clear today. 
Non-governmental military and defense-related research and education had no 
tradition in Hungary, thus these activities have emerged slowly. The direct educational 
function of NGOs has improved a lot especially after joining NATO. Nevertheless, think 
tank activities and alternative evaluations of military issues have not been done, except 
rarely. Consequently, civilian society control over the military, and especially defense-
related bureaucracy, has been miniscule. 
The horizontal dimension of the Hungarian CMR has undergone a long and 
complex learning process. Today tendencies are promising because these organizations 
are more diverse than earlier and the emerging economy could provide additional 
resources for them. Nevertheless, the state support for improving this activity remained 
very important but it calls for considering increasingly democratic values instead of 
short-term political party benefits. Furthermore, the status today of the defense- and 
military-related civil society calls for promotion from NATO and the European Union as 
well. It would be important increasing the attractiveness this field and as a result the 
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(non-political) civilian participation in it, which could be the basis of the improvement of 
the quality of democratic civil-military relations. 
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